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The	growing	importance	of	competitive	neutrality	in	the	national	and	global	market-
place	has	given	rise	to	concerns	about	how	to	ensure	a	 level	playing	field	–	where	state-
owned	enterprises	and	private	entities	compete.	The	paper	aims	to	clarify	the	issue	of	com-
petitive	neutrality	in	general	and	current	challenges	faced	by	Vietnam	policy	makers	com-
mitted	to	the	level	playing	field	between	public	and	private	business	enterprises	in	particu-
lar.	It	is	also	to	serve	as	an	inspiration	to	governments	that	confront	similar	challenges	and	
a	contribution	to	establish	the	competition	regime	based	on	principles	of	competitive	neu-
trality.	This	paper	also	aims	at	establishing	a	comprehensive	overview	of	Vietnam’s	Compe-
tition	environment	and	Competition	Law	as	well	as	presenting	a	representative	picture	of	
Vietnam’s	State-owned	enterprises	and	challenges	for	the	application	of	competitive	neu-
trality	in	Vietnam,	from	that	recommendations	will	be	made.	It	is	carried	out	as	a	study	in	
the	field	of	competitive	neutrality	that	promotes	the	efforts	of	governments	and	policy	mak-
ers	committed	to	the	level	playing	field	between	public	and	private	business	enterprises.	
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Abstract	
The	globalization	trend	has	led	to	dramatic	penetration	of	enterprises	to	every	corner	
of	the	world	economy	demanding	for	a	level	playing	field	so	that	all	economic	entities	are	in	
equal	positions	to	compete	with	the	others.	Establishing	a	level	playing	field	is	needed	in	
developed	market	economies,	but	it	is	even	more	demanding	in	the	developing	part	of	the	
world	where	the	legal	system	is	still	being	completed	and	not	strictly	complied	by	market	
participants.	Also,	a	level	playing	field	is	greatly	concerned	in	the	economies	where	govern-
ment-owned	sector	is	relatively	large	and	inefficient	compared	with	the	private	sector.	Vi-
etnam	is	one	of	such	countries	as	the	need	for	a	level	playing	field	is	not	only	acknowledged	
by	national	policymakers	but	is	also	reflected	in	international	voices.		
	
Keywords:	competitive	neutrality,	a	level	playing	field,	competition	law	and	policy,	
state-owned	enterprises.	
LIST	OF	ABBREVIATIONS	
	
ADB	 Asian	Development	Bank	
AGCNGO	 Australian	Government	Competitive	Neutrality	Complaints	
Office	
APEC	 	 	 	 Asia-Pacific	Economic	Cooperation	
ASEAN		 	 	 Association	of	Southeast	Asian	Nations	
AVG	 	 	 	 Audio	Visual	Global	(The	TV	Provider	of	Vietnam)	
BIT	 	 	 	 Bilateral	Investment	Treaties	
CAC	 	 	 	 Commonwealth	Authorities	and	Companies	
EU	 	 	 	 European	Union	
EVN	 	 	 	 Electricity	of	Vietnam	
FTA	 	 	 	 Free	Trade	Agreement	
GOC	 	 	 	 Government-owned	Corporation	
MIC	 	 	 	 Ministry	of	Information	and	Communications	
OECD	 	 	 	 Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development	
PTA	 	 	 	 Preferential	Trade	Agreement	
SOE	 	 	 	 State-owned	Enterprise	
TTP	 	 	 	 Trans-Pacific	Partnership	
UNCTAD	 	 	 United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	
VAT/GST	 	 	 Value	Added	Tax/	Goods	and	Services	Tax	
VCA	 	 	 	 Vietnam	Competition	Authority	
VCAD	 	 	 	 Vietnam	Competition	Authority	Department	
VCC	 	 	 	 Vietnam	Competition	Council	
VCL	 	 	 	 Vietnam	Competition	Law	
WTO	 	 	 	 World	Trade	Organization	
I.	INTRODUCTION	
1.	Rationale	
The	concept	of	competitive	neutrality	could	be	understood	as	a	regulatory	framework	
(i)	within	which	public	and	private	enterprises	face	the	same	set	of	rules,	and	(ii)	where	no	
contacts	with	the	State	bring	competitive	advantages	to	any	market	participants	SOEs,	which	
may	also	be	known	as	public	enterprises,	referring	to	the	economic	entity	which	is	owned	
by	the	government	rather	than	by	the	private	sector	(OECD,	2009).	Typically,	the	establish-
ment	of	SOEs	followed	the	politically	orientated	decisions	of	the	governments	rather	than	
by	the	commercial	interests	(Sappington/Sidak,	2004).	With	strong	financial	status	and	tre-
mendous	growth,	some	contemporary	SOEs	are	now	the	biggest	multinational	companies	
(Kowalski/Büge/Sztajerowska/Egeland,	2013).	However,	with	great	dependence	on	the	un-
fair	advantages	given	by	the	governments,	this	economic	sector	has	also	been	notorious	for	
anti-competitive	practices	and	lagged	business	performance	(Drexl/Bagnoli,	2015).	From	the	
competitive	perspective,	a	healthy	competition	environment	for	all	market	participators	is	
vital	for	sustainable	development	of	the	economy	(Kumar,	2008).	In	that	sense,	SOEs	do	not	
only	hold	the	whole	economy	back	from	development	by	its	low	levels	of	operational	effi-
ciency	but	also	by	the	practices	that	go	against	the	development	of	a	fairly	competitive	econ-
omy.	
Over	the	previous	years,	limited	amount	of	research	has	been	conducted	on	the	signif-
icant	roles	of	SOEs	to	the	international	market	as	well	as	shedding	light	on	the	exact	nature	
of	 the	unfair	preferences	given	to	SOEs	over	other	business	sectors	virtually	due	to	their	
state	ownership	(Christiansen,	2011).	However,	together	with	the	globalization	trend,	which	
is	the	primary	reason	behind	the	expansion	of	business	activities	in	the	international	arena,	
maintaining	a	vigorous	and	fair	competition	environment	to	create	a	level	playing	field	for	
all	 economic	 sectors	 supporting	 such	 an	 expansion	 trend	has	 also	 become	 a	 highly	 con-
cerned	issue	all	over	the	world.	Promoting	healthy	competitive	environment	in	the	global	
economy	in	general	and	in	different	economies	in	particular,	or	in	other	words,	encouraging	
competitive	neutrality	has	been	highlighted	in	a	huge	number	of	academic	papers	as	well	as	
global	conferences	of	international	organizations	such	as	OECD,	UNCTAD,	WTO,	etc.	(OECD,	
2014).	An	increasing	amount	of	attention	for	competitive	neutrality	is	also	shown	through	a	
number	of	international	economic	agreements	with	which	competitive	neutrality	is	empha-
sized	as	one	of	the	top	economic	issues	in	a	global	scale	(Jin,	2015).	
Regarding	the	vital	roles	of	competitive	neutrality	issues	under	the	light	of	competition	
policy,	it	is	crucial	to	have	a	deeper	assessment	and	analysis,	concerning	opportunities	and	
challenges	which	countries	over	the	world	in	general,	and	Vietnam	in	particular,	must	face.	
Therefore,	researching	and	analyzing	the	strengths	and	weaknesses,	in	both	theoretical	and	
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practical	aspects,	of	competitive	neutrality	issues	are	necessary	for	later	application	of	poli-
cies	among	countries,	and	practical	suggestions	to	Vietnam.	
2.	Literature	review	of	research	
Competitive	neutrality	has	been	an	increasingly	concerned	topic	for	long	in	an	interna-
tional	scale,	however,	 it	has	only	officially	come	into	the	 legislative	field	worldwide	since	
1996	with	the	adoption	of	competitive	neutrality	law	and	policy	in	Australia.	Looking	at	this	
topic	from	the	view	of	developing	countries,	 	a	range	of	academic	papers	which	have	ex-
plored	different	areas	of	competitive	neutrality	in	the	light	of	competition	policy	and	liber-
alization	movement	will	be	reviewed	below.			
Firstly,	the	literature	review	of	competitive	neutrality	research	starts	with	the	contri-
butions	of	OECD	as	 it	 is	one	 the	 leading	 international	economic	organizations	 that	place	
heavy	emphasis	on	the	establishment	of	a	level	playing	field	in	the	national	economies	of	
the	developing	world.	Among	a	lot	of	documents	OECD	published	about	competitive	neu-
trality,	the	two	following	has	drawn	great	attention:	“Policy	roundtables:	State-owned	En-
terprises	and	the	principles	of	Competitive	Neutrality”	(OECD,	2009)	and	then	later	“Compet-
itive	Neutrality:	Maintaining	 a	 level	 playing	 field	 between	 public	 and	 private	 businesses”	
(OECD,	2012).	The	latter	one	focuses	on	presenting	competitive	neutrality	distortions	and	
current	problems	confronted	by	policy	makers	committed	to	obtain	competitive	neutrality	
between	market	participants	in	the	national	economy	of	OECD	countries	including	Vietnam.	
From	that,	it	presents	a	range	of	common	national	practices	that	demonstrate	the	imple-
menting	of	competitive	neutrality	and	emphasize	some	types	of	difficulties	that	may	be	ex-
perienced	(OECD,	2012).		
UNCTAD	also	expresses	their	concerns	about	the	potential	impacts	of	government	in-
terference	on	 the	operation	of	 the	markets	 through	“UNCTAD	research	partnership	plat-
form:	Competitive	Neutrality	and	its	application	in	selected	developing	countries”.	In	this	vol-
ume,	UNCTAD	concentrated	on	the	enforcement	of	competitive	neutrality	policy,	addressed	
the	 existing	 problems	 of	 competitive	 neutrality	 in	many	 parts	 of	 the	world	 including	 Vi-
etnam,	and	the	possibility	of	future	practices	of	competitive	neutrality	in	these	jurisdictions	
(UNCTAD,	2014).	The	approach	of	Australia	in	the	issue	of	competitive	neutrality	has	existed	
for	a	long	time,	more	than	a	decade;	however,	it	does	not	mean	that	this	method	is	suitable	
for	all	other	jurisdictions.	
Next,	a	roundtable	on	the	implications	of	antitrust	law	to	government	owned	compa-
nies,	controversy	on	corporate	governance	and	the	principle	of	competitive	neutrality	for	
the	public	sector	(United	States,	2009)	asserts	that	“Competition	among	private	entities	has	
been	and	remains	the	current	norm	for	the	U.S.	economy”.	The	article	has	successfully	re-
vealed	a	representative	picture	of	the	USA	economy	without	the	existence	of	“state-owned	
enterprise”	term	in	US	legislation	or	laws.	Basically,	the	public	sector	is	a	special	part	of	the	
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economy	due	to	the	uniqueness	in	their	ownership,	governmental	control,	and	participation	
of	 government;	 and	 the	degree	of	 competition	between	 the	public	 and	private	 sector	 is	
mainly	indirect,	negligible	or	non-existent.	
Another	 paper	 that	 is	 worth	 mentioning	 here	 is	 “Competitive	 neutrality	 and	 State	
owned	enterprises	in	Australia:	Review	of	practices	and	their	relevance	for	other	countries”	
(OCED,	2011).	This	volume	presents	a	detailed	summary	of	the	legal	implementation	of	com-
petitive	neutrality	of	individual	States	as	well	as	Australian	Government	as	a	whole.	Based	
on	that,	it	demonstrates	the	evaluation	the	effectiveness	of	Australia’s	competitive	neutral-
ity	framework	and	the	ability	to	apply	to	other	countries	 in	order	to	achieve	competitive	
neutrality	in	their	own	economies.	
Pin-guang	Ying	(2013)	provides	current	trends	and	development	in	the	reform	of	state-
owned	enterprises	in	the	direction	of	setting	up	competitive	neutrality	placing	heavy	em-
phasis	on	such	contents	in	the	economic	context	of	China.	With	proper	awareness	of	the	
opportunities	 that	 competitive	 neutrality	 brings	 to	 the	 national	 economy,	 China	 has	 put	
more	efforts	on	leveling	a	playing	field.	Furthermore,	the	author	also	presents	a	comprehen-
sive	understanding	on	the	basic	position	that	China	has	taken	in	competitive	neutrality	as	
well	as	the	measure	of	competitive	neutrality	in	real	enforcement.	
Pham	(2014)1	provides	a	depth	analysis	of	competitive	neutrality	practice	in	Vietnam	
in	a	relationship	with	fundamental	notions	such	as	competitive	neutrality	principles	in	Com-
petition	Law	of	Vietnam,	competition	law	tools	in	response	to	competitive	neutrality	issues	
of	SOEs,	international	experience	of	competitive	neutrality	principle	applications.	It	means	
that	the	author	examines	the	basic	theories	of	competitive	neutrality	principles	in	the	rela-
tionship	with	practices	of	a	developing	country;	and	simultaneously	proposed	some	recom-
mendations	to	fulfil	Vietnam’s	policies	which	is	still	in	a	long	way	of	achieving	competitive	
neutrality.	
Later,	Wendy	Leutert	(2016)	continued	on	competitive	neutrality	issues	with	an	inves-
tigation	in	the	current	situation	of	SOE	reform	in	China.	Chinese	government	has	significantly	
reduced	the	exercise	of	government	protection	to	SOEs	in	the	market,	however,	the	struc-
tural	transformation	in	China	is	still	far	from	completion,	demanding	for	more	efforts	on	this.	
Three	challenges	imposed	in	the	way	of	competitive	neutrality	establishment	are:	identifying	
the	right	time	to	give	market	forces	a	greater	role;	aligning	managerial	incentives	with	busi-
ness	performance	and	corporate	governance	priorities;	overcoming	difficulties	at	the	com-
pany	level.	
To	sum	up,	competitive	neutrality	 is	still	a	relatively	new	concept	in	most	countries,	
however,	the	broader	issues	such	as	public-private	competition;	and	the	role	of	the	state	in	
                                                
1 Alice Pham, State-owned enterprises & Competitive neutrality principle in Vietnam, in Rosenau/Tang Van, 
(eds. 2014) Economic Competition Regime: Raising Issues and Lessons from Germany, Nomos, Baden-Baden 
(Germany). 
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the	market	place	have	been	largely	controversial	subjects	in	most	jurisdictions,	and	are	in-
creasingly	drawing	the	attention	of	policy-makers.	A	more	comprehensive	review	of	com-
petitive	neutrality	has	been	required	to	help	policy	makers	and	law	keepers	to	have	more	
effective	economic	policies.	Because	Vietnam	is	facing	a	large	number	of	existing	problems	
concerning	a	 level	playing	field,	a	deep	research	with	synthetic	nature	 is	essential	 for	Vi-
etnam	to	propose	more	practical	suggestions	to	improving	this	situation.	
3.	Methodology	
In	order	 to	 gained	 the	above	 stated	goals	 and	objectives,	 a	wide	 range	of	 research	
methods	will	be	combined	and	used	simultaneously	with	the	target	of	efficiency	maximiza-
tion	for	this	research.	The	research	is	planned	to	start	by	going	through	a	number	of	empir-
ical	studies	regarding	competitive	neutrality	in	general	with	special	focus	on	the	developing	
world	in	general	and	Vietnam	in	particular.	Then,	the	literature	review	will	be	finalized	with	
the	main	contents	are	formed	as	well.	Next,	more	reading	will	be	carried	out	to	acquire	deep	
insights	of	each	contents	with	details	of	relevant	case	studies	of	each	theme	be	collected.		
Firstly,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	research	was	built	upon	information	input	from	both	
primary	and	secondary	 sources.	This	 research	used	secondary	 research	which	are	widely	
available	 to	 the	public	 from	numerous	 sources:	 law	documents	 and	 competition	 reports	
from	specialized	government	departments	like	VCA,	academic	papers	from	international	or-
ganizations	such	as	OECD,	WTO,	UNCTAD,	etc.	informative	articles	about	real	case	studies	
relating	to	competitive	neutrality	from	newspapers	and	other	media	means	from	numerous	
Vietnamese	and	foreign	experts,	reliable	grey	literature	(coming	from	other	sources	in	the	
Internet	rather	than	from	the	government	or	other	traditional	distribution	channels).	In	ad-
dition,	a	small	proportion	of	detailed	primary	data	will	be	derived	from	participant	observa-
tions	of	the	operation	of	SOEs	in	the	relevant	markets	and	in	Vietnamese	national	economy	
as	a	whole.	
Secondly,	qualitative	comparative	analysis	will	be	conducted	throughout	the	research	
on	the	collected	facts,	also	information	withdrawn	from	countries	will	draw	a	vivid	picture	
of	the	complex	world	of	competitive	neutrality	and	highlight	Vietnam	case.	
Lastly,	 improvements	to	the	research	will	be	made	from	careful	check	and	practical	
advice	from	experts	in	this	field.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	some	other	methods	such	as	
interpretation,	demonstration,	brainstorming	and	synthesis	are	also	applied	in	the	process	
of	research	completion.			
4.	Expected	research	results		
The	ultimate	goal	of	this	research	is	to	promote	the	development	of	competitive	neu-
trality	from	the	theoretical	perspective	with	great	focus	on	the	challenges	imposed	on	the	
establishment	of	a	level	playing	field	in	the	unique	economic	context	of	Vietnam.		
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Furthermore,	it	should	also	be	stressed	that	the	most	important	contribution	of	this	
research	is	the	principal	recommendations	for	the	real	applications	of	competitive	neutral-
ity.	The	expected	research	results	are	to	lay	a	comprehensive	background	for	the	applica-
tions	of	competitive	neutrality	for	Vietnamese	government	and	policy	makers	in	making	ef-
forts	for	a	level	playing	field.	It	is	expected	that	this	research	will	have	great	impacts	on	the	
establishment	and	the	implementation	of	the	competitive	neutrality	regime,	which	intended	
to	remove	resource	allocation	distortions	arising	out	of	public	ownership	of	significant	busi-
ness	activities	and	to	improve	competitive	processes.		
In	the	conceptual	framework	of	research,	the	authors	aim	at	having	an	article	published	
in	peer-reviewed	journal.		
II.	THE	FUNDAMENTALS	OF	COMPETITION	LAW,	COMPETITIVE	NEUTRALITY	
1.	The	Fundamentals	of	Competition	Law	
a)	The	concept	of	competition	
Competition	appears	in	every	corner	of	life,	long	before	the	formal	study	of	competi-
tion	started.	It	is	said	that	competition	stays	in	the	opposite	side	of	cooperation.	Competi-
tion	occurs	when	there	are	two	or	more	parties	trying	to	achieve	something	beneficial	which	
cannot	be	shared	(Keddy,	2001).	During	the	history	of	competition	study,	it	is	well	known	
that	competition	has	both	positive	and	negative	impacts.	Competition	is	the	driving	force	
for	further	improvements	as	competition	makes	all	participants	strive	to	be	better,	and	that	
is	 underlying	 reason	 of	 development,	with	 evolution	 is	 one	 of	 undeniable	 proof	 for	 the	
power	of	competition.	On	the	other	hand,	the	detrimental	effects	of	competition	come	from	
the	losses	and	damage	as	well	as	the	waste	of	resources	used	for	competition	process	while	
they	can	be	put	to	better	use	such	as	training	and	education.	The	study	in	this	field	is	ex-
pected	to	utilize	competition	through	minimizing	its	undesirable	outcomes	while	maximizing	
the	possible	benefits	at	the	same	time	(Keddy,	2001).	
In	economic	context,	competition	refers	to	the	rivalry	among	competitors	for	business	
relating	benefits	in	favor	of	commercial	gains	such	as	profits,	market	share,	sales	volume,	
etc.	In	other	words,	competition	can	be	understood	as	the	independent	attempts	of	two	or	
more	parties	to	secure	the	business	of	a	third	party	through	offering	the	advantageous	con-
ditions	for	business	transactions	(Merriam-Webster,	1828).	Competition	is	an	inevitable	fac-
tor	of	any	economy;	therefore,	economists	study	competition	in	order	to	get	the	best	out	of	
an	element	that	has	long	been	attributed	to	negative	attitude	in	any	playing	field.	Competi-
tion	can	be	the	motivation	for	efficiency	and	fairness	in	the	economy,	leading	to	changes,	
innovations	 and	 development	 (Graham/Richardson,	 1997).	 In	 contrary,	 competition	 can	
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hold	the	whole	economy	back	from	development	when	competition	is	distorted	and	all	mar-
ket	participants	compete	in	an	unfair	manner.	So	as	to	take	advantage	of	the	power	of	com-
petition	in	the	drive	to	an	effective	economy,	competition	law	is	established	as	a	means	of	
the	government	to	control	and	orientate	competition	in	the	economy.		
b)	The	concept	of	competition	law	
The	history	of	competition	law	can	be	traced	back	to	the	Roman	Empire	indicating	the	
attempts	of	official	authority	to	set	out	rules	for	competitive	markets	of	goods	and	services.	
With	 increasing	 awareness	 of	 the	 paramount	 importance	of	 competition	 law	by	 govern-
ments	all	over	the	world,	competition	law	has	dramatically	spread	on	an	international	scale	
since	the	twentieth	century	(Topping,	Tweedale,	2014).	Competition	law	is	defined	as	a	sys-
tem	of	regulations	to	build	up	market	competition	through	controlling	and	eliminating	anti-
competitive	practices	of	enterprises	(Li/Li,	2013).	The	implementation	of	competition	law	is	
carried	out	through	both	public	and	private	enforcement	(Moerllers/Heinemann	2007).	
Competition	law’s	presence	is	quite	different	in	various	parts	of	the	world.	In	the	past,	
trade	practice	law	in	United	Kingdom	and	Australia	is	considered	as	the	early	form	of	com-
petition	law.	Differently,	it	is	regarded	as	anti-trust	law	in	the	United	States	and	European	
Union,	while	 in	China	and	Russia	 it	 is	referred	as	anti-monopoly	 law	(Taylor,	2006).	Now,	
there	are	more	than	130	competition	law	systems	existing	in	the	world	with	several	other	
countries	 are	 in	 the	 process	 of	 adopting	 their	 own	 competition	 law	 and	 policies	
(Rodger/MacCulloch,	2014).	So	far,	most	nations	in	the	world	has	already	enacted	their	own	
competition	law	with	the	two	biggest	and	most	influential	competition	law	systems	are	of	
United	States	antitrust	law	and	EU	competition	law	(Taylor,	2006).	
c)	Framework	of	competition	law	
Under	unique	economic	circumstances	of	particular	countries,	the	implications	and	en-
forcement	of	competition	laws	can	be	very	different.	However,	with	the	same	general	goal	
of	 establishing	 and	 maintaining	 healthy	 competition	 in	 the	 economy,	 the	 fundamental	
framework	of	competition	law	is	quite	similar	from	country	to	country	all	over	the	world.	In	
general,	the	two	primary	contents	of	competition	law	are	the	law	against	unfair	competition	
and	the	law	against	restraints	of	competition	(Tang	Van,	2013).		
- The	law	against	unfair	competition	is	generated	as	the	central	content	of	competition	
law	as	it	is	under	the	principal	goal	of	competition	legal	framework.	This	law	aims	to	create	
a	fair	competitive	environment	for	all	business	entities,	protecting	the	more	vulnerable	ones	
from	the	powerful	ones	in	the	relevant	markets.	From	that,	this	content	prevents	all	anti-
competitive	behaviors	ensuring	that	all	rights	and	interests	of	market	participants	are	safe-
guarded	by	competition	 law.	The	abuse	of	dominant	market	position	 is	one	of	the	major	
unfair	competitive	acts	that	competition	law	deals	with,	which	refers	to	the	acts	taken	by	
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several	 enterprises	owning	 the	dominant	market	 share	 in	 the	 relevant	markets.	As	 large	
amount	of	market	share	belongs	to	one	or	 just	some	companies,	 it	 is	 totally	possible	 for	
them	to	take	advantage	of	their	market	power	to	carry	out	harmful	actions	to	the	fair	com-
petitive	market	in	order	to	maintain	and	strengthen	their	position	before	other	smaller	com-
petitors	in	the	market	(Rodger/MacCulloch,	2014).		
- The	law	against	restraints	of	competition	is	the	second	major	content	in	competition	
legal	 framework,	which	appears	 in	all	competition	 law	systems	 in	the	world.	Competitive	
restraining	acts	happen	with	the	ongoing	development	of	the	economy,	when	enterprises	
see	the	correlative	relationship	between	market	power	and	the	accumulation	of	capital	or	
market	share.	In	the	modern	times,	the	law	against	restraints	of	competition	is	an	insepara-
ble	part	of	competition	law,	known	as	Cartel	Law	which	regulates	the	economic	activities	
built	up	from	the	collaboration	of	a	group	of	enterprises	in	the	same	market	which	hinder	
the	implementation	of	free	competition.	For	example,	anti-competitive	agreements	-	one	of	
the	most	common	types	of	restraints	of	competition	acts	-	as	it	is	called,	refers	to	the	agree-
ments	made	and	followed	by	market	participants	 in	which	they	agree	to	take	actions	to-
gether	so	that	they	got	the	advantage	to	compete	with	other	competitors	who	do	not	attend	
the	agreement.	When	some	enterprises	in	the	same	relevant	market	collaborate	together,	
the	agreement	creates	significant	market	power	for	them	to	limit	other	competitors	outside	
the	agreement	(Rodger/MacCulloch,	2014).		
d)	The	goals	of	competition	law	
Competition	law	has	become	increasingly	ubiquitous	all	over	the	world	when	it	can	be	
found	in	all	continents,	all	regions,	all	kinds	of	economies	–	regardless	of	large	or	small,	con-
tinental	or	 island,	developed	or	developing,	 industrial	or	trading	or	agricultural,	 liberal	or	
post-communist.	In	an	economy,	competition	law	is	created	following	the	existence	of	ri-
valry	between	market	participants,	therefore	it	interferes	with	all	economic	sectors	under	
the	 fundamental	 rule	of	 the	 freedom	of	competition.	Competition	 law	 is	normally	 issued	
with	the	general	objective	of	generating	a	legal	basis	for	the	establishment	and	long	term	
maintaining	of	healthy	competition	for	all	business	entities	in	the	market	mechanism.	In	or-
der	to	fulfil	its	function,	competition	law	control	competitive	relating	practices	through	reg-
ulation	of	behavior	model	for	the	business	entities	as	well	as	legal	punishment	for	all	busi-
ness	entities	contravening	the	stated	rules	of	competition,	which	is	in	the	direction	of	main	
specific	objectives	as	below.	
-	Protecting	competition	process:	Many	economists	hold	the	same	view	that	the	pri-
mary	purpose	of	competition	law	is	to	act	as	the	driving	force	of	effective	competition	pro-
cess.	In	other	words,	competition	law	lays	the	background	for	competition	relating	regula-
tions	applying	to	rivalries	in	the	market.	The	root	cause	of	mounting	concern	for	protecting	
competitive	process	can	be	traced	back	through	the	long	history	of	economic	development.	
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In	the	beginning,	each	economy	was	quite	like	a	close	circle	in	which	it	produced	and	con-
sumed	its	products	by	itself,	and	it	could	be	seen	that	there	is	not	much	competition	among	
economies.	However,	when	it	comes	to	the	next	stage	of	development,	countries	could	see	
that	they	can	all	benefit	from	trading,	therefore,	economies	come	closer	and	be	more	open	
to	exchange.	Thanks	to	advanced	technology	the	movement	of	goods	and	service	has	be-
come	quick	and	easy	enabling	the	emergence	of	the	globalization	trend	which	brings	econ-
omies	closer	to	others	with	all	economies	enter	a	global	economy	where	competition	is	in-
evitable.	That	is	when	government	interference	to	back	up	the	position	of	nation	economy	
in	the	international	arena	can	be	seen	clearly	than	ever.	Economic	study	and	real	historic	
lessons	have	widened	the	horizon	of	the	whole	world	that	free	market	system	or	free	com-
petition	is	the	perfect	way	for	the	market	to	function	and	that	is	mostly	the	case	in	the	real	
world.	The	intervention	of	the	official	authority	is	only	needed	when	the	free	market	system	
fails,	otherwise,	it	can	hold	the	whole	economy	back	from	development,	or	even	worse,	hin-
der	the	growth	of	the	economy.	On	the	other	hand,	a	perfectly	functioning	competitive	pro-
cess	in	the	market	lead	to	maximization	of	resources,	resulting	in	allocative	and	productive	
efficiency	maximization,	and	finally,	that	is	maximization	of	social	welfare	(Moisejevas/No-
vosad,	2013).		
-	Protecting	consumer:	Beside	the	principal	objective	of	protecting	competitive	process,	
protecting	consumer	is	another	main	aim	of	almost	all	countries	adopting	competition	law.	
Once,	in	the	beginning	stage	of	competition	law,	it	was	based	on	a	variety	of	rationales,	such	
as	protecting	small	businesses	before	dominant	market	participants,	putting	all	business	en-
tities	in	an	equal	footing	in	legal	terms,	etc.	However,	now,	competition	is	not	only	about	
competitors	 in	 the	 relevant	markets,	 consumers	which	are	also	an	 important	part	of	 the	
market	are	now	at	the	central	of	competition	law	(OECD,	2008).	The	interface	between	com-
petition	law	and	consumer	protection	lies	in	consumer	welfare	reaching	the	optimal	point,	
in	which	consumer	benefits	are	ensured	through	price	and	product	choice.	Government	can	
use	competition	law	as	an	official	tool	to	set	up	the	ceiling	price	in	a	particular	market	making	
sure	that	such	products	are	always	at	reasonable	price	for	normal	consumption.	Also,	com-
petition	law	creates	the	certainty	for	a	wide	range	of	product	choices	for	consumers,	except	
for	some	markets	where	monopoly	is	necessary.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	in	the	market	
where	competitive	process	is	perfectly	functioning,	the	enhancement	of	consumer	welfare	
can	also	be	reflected	through	the	improved	quality	of	the	products	(Buttigieg,	2009).		
-	Protecting	competitors:	When	protecting	competitors	is	carried	out	in	the	real	world	
as	one	of	the	cornerstone	of	competition	law,	that	helps	enhancements	to	market	structure.	
With	reference	to	protecting	competition	process,	rivalries	in	the	market	are	the	subjects	
that	directly	take	competitive	actions,	hence,	only	when	all	competitors	are	treated	in	an	
equal	manner,	 the	competitive	process	can	be	activated	 to	 reach	 its	maximum	potential	
bringing	enormous	benefits	to	the	economy.	With	reference	to	protecting	consumers,	while	
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competitors	are	protected,	all	market	participants	have	no	choice	but	competing	through	
improving	the	goods	and	service	that	they	deliver,	as	a	result,	consumers	have	access	to	high	
quality	products.	The	main	role	of	competition	law	is	also	to	protect	small	and	medium-size	
enterprises	before	unfair	 competitive	practices	of	monopolists	and	cartels	 (WIPO,	1994).	
Small	and	medium-sized	competitors	belong	to	the	vulnerable	group,	which	can	be	nega-
tively	affected	by	aggressive	competition	from	bigger	competitors.	These	competitors	will	
be	protected	by	the	tools	of	competition	law.		
-	Redistribution:	While	it	can	clearly	be	seen	that	economic	efficiency	is	heavily	stressed	
throughout	competition	law,	this	law	does	not	ignore	economic	equity	as	it	does	pay	signif-
icant	attention	to	wealth	redistribution	from	big	corporations	to	small	companies,	or	from	
producers	to	consumers	 in	the	market	(Dunne,	2015).	Under	the	general	goal	of	creating	
healthy	competition	for	all	enterprises	in	the	market,	the	accumulation	of	economic	power	
and	wealth	in	one	or	a	few	business	entities	can	put	the	fair	competition	at	risk	of	collapsing.	
Therefore,	redistribution,	along	with	the	other	main	objectives,	they	do	not	only	support	
each	other	but	they	also	increase	the	effectiveness	of	competition	law	together.	
e)	Competition	Policy	
Having	been	through	long	history	of	evolvement	and	development,	competition	policy,	
until	now,	is	still	on	the	way	of	completing	itself	to	fit	the	given	economic	context.	It	is	not	
easy	to	define	competition	policy	(or	which	is	often	called	anti-trust	law	in	the	US)	as	there	
are	so	many	controversial	opinions	about	this	issue,	even	competition	policy	has	been	a	sub-
ject	of	economists’	attention	for	quite	a	long	time.	Competition	law	might	be	referred	to	as	
“the	set	of	policies	and	 laws	which	ensure	 that	competition	 in	 the	marketplace	 is	not	 re-
stricted	in	the	way	that	is	detrimental	to	society”	(Motta,	2004).	The	introduction	of	compe-
tition	policy	was	inspired	by	a	number	of	objectives	considering	the	huge	impacts	of	a	per-
fect	competition	mechanism	on	optimizing	market	efficiency.	The	principal	targets	of	com-
petition	policy	include:	
-	Protection	of	the	process	of	competition:	Similar	to	the	goal	of	competition	law,	com-
petition	policy	is	designed	to	promote	competition	and	to	protect	the	process	of	competi-
tion	(rather	than	individual	competitors)	in	a	free	market	economy.	
-	Economic	welfare:	Competition	policy	contributes	to	the	productivity	and	efficiency	
of	market	operation.	All	enterprises	in	the	relevant	market	will	really	have	to	strike	to	per-
form	better	and	gain	more	market	share.	
-	Consumer	welfare:	The	healthy	competition	in	the	market,	which	is	encouraged	and	
promoted	by	competition	policy	also	helps	to	protect	the	benefits	of	consumers.	
-	Defense	of	smaller	firms:	In	the	market,	when	only	one	or	a	few	companies	obtaining	
the	dominant	market	share,	it	is	apparent	that	they	have	competitive	advantage	to	compete	
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and	 it	would	surely	be	a	difficult	 situation	 for	 smaller	 firms.	Basically,	 competition	policy	
aims	at	creating	a	fair	competitive	environment	for	all	market	participants	(Motta,	2004).	
2.	The	theory	of	competitive	neutrality	
a)	The	emergence	and	development	of	competitive	neutrality	issue	
Technological	innovations,	globalization	trend	and	increasing	number	of	international	
trade	agreements	between	countries	have	turned	the	history	of	the	world	economy	into	a	
new	page	(Hormats,	2011).	While	advanced	technology	and	globalization	trend	opens	up	
opportunities	of	new	promising	markets,	trade	agreements	 in	a	regional,	continental	and	
international	scale	helps	to	eliminate	trade	barriers	among	nations	all	over	the	world.	In	that	
given	 situation,	 open	 international	 competition	 has	 become	 the	 dominant	 trends	 in	 the	
global	economy	(Welfens,	1999).	This	calls	for	the	establishment	of	fair	competition	in	the	
markets	so	that	all	market	participants	are	in	equal	positions	to	compete.	Being	encouraged	
by	this	notion,	governments	all	over	the	world	have	paid	more	attention	to	competition	is-
sue	with	the	aim	of	setting	up	a	level	playing	field	in	their	own	national	economy.	Regarding	
competition	issues,	competition	law	is	one	of	the	most	powerful	means	in	the	government’s	
toolbox.	However,	the	problems	emerging	from	the	establishment	of	a	 level	playing	field	
also	come	from	the	official	authority	who	has	been	exercising	the	protection	of	SOEs	for	
long.		
Strengthening	the	economic	position	of	the	country	in	the	international	arena	is	not	
the	only	reason	for	the	foundation	of	government	owned	sector	and	for	the	support	of	the	
official	authority	to	them.	So	far,	in	most	parts	of	the	world,	SOEs	which	are	owned	by	the	
government	significantly	represent	state	orientations	in	the	marketplace,	delivering	the	so-
cialist	instructions	of	the	government	to	the	national	economy	(World	Bank,	2014).	In	order	
to	fulfil	their	responsibility,	SOEs	are	given	incentives	and	even	unfair	advantages	over	the	
private	sector.	The	protection	of	governments	to	their	SOEs	is	not	only	being	driven	by	com-
mercial	interests	but	also	due	to	non-commercial	priorities	such	as	providing	vital	public	ser-
vice	obligations,	promoting	national	champions	through	industrial	policy,	protecting	fiscal	
revenue	derived	from	SOEs,	reacting	to	market	failures	and	other	politically	sensitive	issues	
such	as	safeguarding	the	political	influence	of	ministries	and	protecting	public	sector	jobs	
(Muir/Saba,	1995).	However,	there	is	a	growing	concern	for	SOEs	to	take	advantage	of	their	
favorable	position	to	take	into	anticompetitive	actions	in	the	market	environment	(Chang,	
2004).	The	dramatic	development	of	SOEs	has	risen	the	broad	issue	of	competition	between	
public	and	private	bidders	being	a	topic	of	tense	discussions,	causing	increasing	concern	as	
a	“21st	century	issue”	(OECD,	2013).	With	the	support	from	governments,	SOEs	are	emerg-
ing	as	fierce	international	competitors	representing	their	own	countries	in	a	number	of	stra-
tegic	markets.	On	the	other	hand,	SOEs	are	seen	with	insufficient	performance	benchmarks	
and	corporate	governance,	problems	of	inefficiency	and	monopoly	position	bringing	from	
    
11 
financial	governmental	supports,	and	the	lack	of	competitiveness	(CHIA†,	2013).		Such	situ-
ation	calls	for	a	legal	framework	to	maintain	a	fair	competitive	environment	for	all	business	
entities	of	the	economy,	which	is	officially	referred	in	competition	law	documents	as	“com-
petitive	neutrality”	(Drexl/Bagnoli,	2015).			
Competitive	neutrality,	in	the	beginning,	normally	appears	in	the	context	of	competi-
tion	 law.	 	 In	Competition	Law,	public	restriction	of	competition	 is	the	content	preventing	
SOEs	from	restrictions	and	distortions	of	competition,	which,	in	other	words,	means	com-
petitive	neutrality	(Whish/Bailey,	2012).	Competitive	neutrality	was	enacted	as	an	independ-
ent	separate	law	for	the	first	time	in	1996	in	Australia	(Lane,	1997).	Since	then,	competitive	
neutrality	has	become	increasingly	ubiquitous	wide	spreading	all	over	the	world	receiving	
great	concern	from	a	number	of	governments.	Competitive	neutrality	aims	at	treating	public	
and	private	enterprises	in	an	equal	manner	and	relations	with	the	States	do	not	bring	any	
competitive	advantages	to	any	market	participants	(Khosrow-Pour,	2007).	 	Together	with	
that,	an	effective	legal	framework	is	required	to	not	only	ensure	the	continuous	contribu-
tions	of	SOEs	to	sustainable	economic	development	but	also	to	maintain	competitive	neu-
trality	between	publicly	owned	enterprises	and	private	entities	 in	 the	economic	environ-
ment.	
b)	The	concept	of	competitive	neutrality	
So	far,	most	nations	have	agreed	that	competitive	neutrality	is	a	sound	notion	and	that	
they	take	actions	to	put	this	idea	into	practice	in	their	national	competition	regime.	So,	it	is	
obvious	that	the	concept	of	competitive	neutrality	has	become	a	widespread	term	in	the	
global	economy.	However,	the	interpretation	of	competitive	neutrality	concept	in	various	
parts	of	the	world	still	contains	differences.		
Regarding	 the	definition	of	competitive	neutrality,	OECD	–	a	very	proactive	 interna-
tional	organization	in	encouraging	a	level	playing	in	its	member	countries	has	given	out	sev-
eral	versions.	The	fundamental	ideas	for	the	concept	of	competitive	neutrality	published	by	
OECD	is	to	promote	a	level	playing	field	where	no	business	entities	enjoy	any	advantages	or	
suffer	from	any	disadvantages	due	to	its	ownership.	A	typical	example	of	competitive	neu-
trality	concept	given	by	OECD	is	said	“Competitive	neutrality	can	be	understood	as	a	regula-
tory	framework	(i)	within	which	public	and	private	enterprises	face	the	same	set	of	rules	and	
(ii)	where	no	contact	with	the	state	brings	competitive	advantage	to	any	market	participant”	
(OECD,	2009).	In	a	strict	sense,	competitive	neutrality	can	be	understood	as	a	legal	and	reg-
ulatory	environment	in	which	all	enterprises,	public	or	private,	face	the	same	set	of	rules,	
and	government	ownership	or	 involvement	does	not	bring	unjustified	advantages	 to	any	
entity.	In	a	wider	sense,	competitive	neutrality	can	be	referred	as	a	market	framework	within	
which	relations	with	the	state	do	not	bring	any	competitive	advantage	to	any	market	partic-
ipants.	With	reference	to	the	situation	of	mixed	markets,	competitive	neutrality	between	
public	and	private	enterprises	is	defined	as	following	“Competitive	neutrality	occurs	where	
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no	entity	operating	in	an	economic	market	is	subject	to	undue	competitive	advantages	or	
disadvantages”.	(OECD,	2012).	There	are	two	points	to	clarify	here	from	this	definition	which	
are:	“undue	advantages	or	disadvantages”	and	“operating	in	an	economic	market”.	For	the	
first	one,	advantages	may	be	granted	to	business	entities	in	compensation	for	countervailing	
obligations,	which	would	generally	not	imply	a	departure	from	competitive	neutrality.	For	
the	second	one,	an	enterprise	may	be	cannot	enter	the	market	due	to	invisible	market	bar-
riers	created	by	companies	who	are	already	operating	in	the	market,	which	can	normally	be	
considered	as	violation	of	competitive	neutrality.	
Similarly,	Australia	adopted	the	concept	of	competitive	neutrality	as	business	activities	
do	not	enjoy	net	competitive	advantages	over	their	private	sector	competitors	(or	potential	
competitors)	 simply	by	 virtue	of	 their	 public-sector	ownership	 (Capobianco/Christiansen,	
2011).	The	definition	indicates	Australia’s	stress	on	the	fair	competitiveness	between	public	
and	private	sector	of	 the	economy.	Government	businesses,	whether	 they	are	Common-
wealth,	 State	 or	 Local	 Government,	 should	 operate	without	 the	 competitive	 advantages	
over	other	businesses	as	a	result	of	their	public	ownership.	
In	summary,	competitive	neutrality	is	still	a	rather	new	phase	in	the	global	economy,	
which	highlights	the	efforts	of	government	in	the	direction	of	the	efficiency	(allocative,	pro-
ductive	and	dynamic	efficiency)	arising	out	of	public	ownership	of	significant	business	activ-
ities	and	to	complete	the	competitive	process.	Therefore,	competitive	neutrality	means	that	
state-related	firms/entities	and	private	firms	compete	on	a	level	playing	field	in	order	to	use	
resources	effectively	within	the	economy	and	thus	to	achieving	growth	and	development.	
c)	Objectives	of	competitive	neutrality		
-	Creating	the	fair	competitive	environment	
One	of	the	primary	objectives	of	competitive	neutrality	is	to	promote	the	creation	of	
healthy	competitive	environment	in	the	economy	through	eliminating	or	offsetting	all	the	
unfair	advantages	enjoyed	by	the	public	sector	owing	to	their	public	ownership.	Fair	compe-
tition	means	that	all	commercial	entities	which	are	operating	in	the	same	market	are	in	equal	
positions	to	compete	regardless	of	their	ownership	or	their	relations	with	the	State.	In	other	
words,	competitive	neutrality	regime	generates	a	legal	environment	ensuring	the	implemen-
tation	of	fair	competition	by	dealing	with	business	practices	that	do	harm	to	the	competitive	
environment	in	the	market.	
The	reason	for	the	support	of	governments	to	a	level	playing	field	in	the	international	
arena,	in	general	and	in	their	national	economy,	in	particular	lies	in	the	fact	that	a	fair	com-
petitive	environment	is	beneficial	for	the	continuous	and	sustainable	improvement	of	mar-
ket	operational	efficiency.	In	a	fairly	competing	economy,	enterprises	can	only	win	market	
share	from	their	competitors	by	their	internal	growth,	which	means	improvements	in	their	
productivity	and	business	performance.	As	a	result,	the	economy	and	society	as	a	whole	get	
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huge	benefits	from	that,	especially	comparing	to	the	situation	of	a	market	that	is	stagnated	
by	the	dominance	of	inefficiently	performing	SOEs.	With	high	expectation	from	the	desirable	
outcomes	of	a	fair	competitive	environment,	competitive	neutrality	is	widely	used	as	one	of	
the	most	powerful	tools	for	governments	to	achieve	that.	
-	Domestic	economic	development	
It	has	been	proved	that	the	process	of	competitive	neutrality	and	the	development	of	
domestic	market	have	a	positive	correlative	relationship.	To	be	more	specific,	competitive	
neutrality	acts	as	the	driving	force	to	the	domestic	economic	development.	When	govern-
ment-owned	sector	and	private	entities	compete	in	a	level	playing,	in	order	to	create	com-
petitive	advantage	over	other	competitors	and	gain	market	share,	there	is	no	way	but	to	
improve	themselves	to	be	better.	As	a	result,	resources	are	used	more	effectively	within	the	
economy	in	the	interest	of	huge	growth	and	development	leading	to	booming	results	in	the	
production	of	goods	and	services	leading	to	sustainable	economic	growth	and	poverty	re-
duction.	
In	addition,	when	competitive	neutrality	is	achieved	in	an	economy,	small	and	medium-
sized	enterprises	are	no	long	be	affected	by	unfair	competitive	practices	of	big	companies	in	
the	relevant	markets.	It	is	apparent	that	the	booming	of	small	enterprises	acting	as	the	push	
for	creativity	and	 innovations	 in	the	market	can	significantly	contribute	to	the	success	of	
market	mechanism	instead	of	holding	the	whole	economy	back	from	development.	There-
fore,	the	existence	of	fair	competition	creates	great	opportunities	for	them	to	compete	in	
an	equal	footing	with	stronger	firms,	or	even	dominant	companies	in	the	market.		
-	Social	welfare	and	equity	considerations	
Social	welfare	refers	to	the	benefits	that	the	economy	receives	as	a	whole,	while	equity	
considerations	mean	that	all	business	entities	will	be	treated	in	the	same	manner	from	legal	
perspective.	 Competitive	 neutrality	 helps	 the	 governments	 to	 achieve	 both	 above	men-
tioned	objectives	 through	 the	enforcement	of	 competitive	neutrality	 law	and	policies.	 In	
terms	of	social	welfare,	society	benefits	 from	a	perfectly	 functioning	competitive	mecha-
nism,	well	performed	enterprises,	consumers’	interests	are	guaranteed,	improved	quality	of	
goods	and	services,	and	so	on.	Through	promoting	a	healthy	competitive	environment	in	the	
economy,	competitive	neutrality	legal	framework	does	not	only	provide	motivations	for	en-
terprises	in	the	market	to	improve	their	performance	but	also	give	incentives	for	potential	
firms	to	enter	the	market	with	new	ideas	and	innovations.	As	a	result,	consumers	also	get	
mounting	benefits	from	high	quality	products	coming	at	a	reasonable	price	and	wide-range	
choices.	In	terms	of	equity	considerations,	it	is	clearly	reflected	in	the	primary	goals	of	com-
petitive	neutrality	that	fairness	would	be	maintained	among	all	commercial	entities	irrespec-
tive	of	their	relations	with	the	government.	
-	The	interests	of	consumers	generally	or	a	class	of	consumers	
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Competitive	neutrality	law	aims	at	promoting	and	establishing	a	level	playing	field	for	
all	commercial	entities,	in	which	none	of	them	has	competitive	advantage	over	their	com-
petitors	virtually	because	of	their	ownership	status.	This	results	in	a	fair	competition	envi-
ronment	in	the	markets,	and	market	participants	are	not	the	only	ones	who	benefit	from	
that.	Consumers	in	general,	and	relevant	consumers	of	that	market	in	particular	are	also	in	
the	position	of	directly	benefiting	from	that.		
Competitive	neutrality	enables	the	increasing	practice	of	market	contestability	which	
brings	huge	 changes	 to	 the	markets	 that	 traditionally	dominated	by	 state-owned	 sector.	
When	all	enterprises	compete	with	each	other,	under	heavy	competitive	pressure	they	will	
all	have	to	follow	customers’	desire	and	needs	so	as	to	gain	more	market	share	over	their	
competitors.	This	situation	puts	all	market	participants	 in	a	position	that	they	never	stop	
improve	their	product	quality	as	well	as	offer	the	lowest	price	possible	to	win	more	custom-
ers.	As	a	 result,	consumers	will	benefit	 from	 increasing	competitive	pricing	practices	and	
improved	quality	of	goods	and	services.	
-	Increasing	the	competitiveness	of	enterprises	
SOEs	are	granted	undue	advantages	and	preferential	treatment	to	support	them	in	ful-
filling	their	responsibility	claimed	by	the	official	authority.	The	market	power	of	the	govern-
ment	owned	sector	to	make	significant	changes	in	the	relevant	markets	does	not	come	from	
its	internal	growth	but	from	the	support	of	the	government.	Although	that	helps	the	state	
to	achieve	its	goals	through	the	business	practices	of	SOEs,	it	does	have	harmful	effects	to	
the	ability	to	compete	of	them.	It	is	mostly	the	case	in	a	number	of	countries	in	the	world	
that	as	depending	too	much	on	the	protection	of	the	government,	the	public	sector	loses	its	
competitiveness	over	the	private	one.	Competitive	neutrality	promotes	the	fair	competition	
between	all	kinds	of	business	entities	and	when	relations	with	the	government	is	no	longer	
in	place	to	bring	competitive	advantages	to	the	government	owned	sector,	it	is	put	in	the	
position	where	it	has	no	choice	but	to	enhance	their	competitiveness.	In	other	words,	com-
petitive	neutrality	law	forces	the	SOEs	to	come	out	of	its	comfort	zone	and	compete	with	its	
real	ability,	which	can	be	considered	as	the	motivations	for	increasing	the	competitiveness	
of	them.	
-	The	efficient	allocation	of	resource	
It	cannot	be	denied	that	resource	scarcity	is	the	common	situation	in	nations	all	over	
the	world.	Therefore,	the	effectiveness	of	resource	allocation	in	a	way	that	still	maintains	
fairness	being	implemented	in	the	society	is	one	of	the	highly	concerned	issues	of	govern-
ments.	The	 legal	 framework	of	competitive	neutrality	 is	also	created	under	this	umbrella	
with	reference	to	the	efficient	allocation	of	resource.	
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In	a	number	of	countries	in	the	world,	SOEs	are	still	the	dominant	sector	of	the	econ-
omy	playing	the	role	as	a	vital	part	of	the	economic	development.	Acting	as	the	leading	busi-
ness	entity	in	the	market	delivering	the	socialist	and	political	idea	of	the	government,	the	
public	sector	is	given	incentives	and,	sometimes,	even	unfair	advantages	to	support	the	com-
pletion	of	its	responsibility.	However,	it	 is	not	a	rare	case	in	the	world	that	governmental	
sector	 is	not	the	most	productive	part	of	the	economy,	 in	compare	with	the	private	one.	
Hence,	competitive	neutrality	law	and	policies	is	put	in	place	with	the	aim	that	those	scarce	
resources	of	a	country	are	distributed	 in	 the	most	effective	manner.	 In	order	 to	do	that,	
competitive	neutrality	regime	directs	the	whole	economy	towards	the	equity	in	the	sense	
that	national	resources	will	be	provided	and	utilized	by	the	enterprises	who	can	make	the	
best	out	of	them	and	the	public	sector	will	only	be	granted	enough	preferential	to	fulfil	its	
responsibility.	
d)	Law	and	policy	towards	competitive	neutrality	
According	to	the	basic	principle	of	competitive	neutrality,	any	competitive	advantages	
or	disadvantages	originated	 from	virtue	ownership	 status	of	government	business	enter-
prises	over	their	private	competitors	in	the	market	must	be	excluded.	Under	that,	competi-
tive	neutrality	aims	at	effective	resource	allocation	and	enhanced	competitive	processes,	
resulting	in	the	ultimate	economic	efficiency	and	welfare	maximization.	A	competitive	neu-
trality	policy	contains	a	wide	range	of	measures,	consisting	of	advantage	neutralizing	regu-
lations	applied	to	public	business	in	the	area	of	debt	financing,	eliminating	anti-competitive	
cross-subsidization	between	commercial	and	non-commercial	activities,	regulation	and	tax-
ation	and	the	establishment	of	commercial	rate	of	return	on	the	public	capital	used.	It	does	
not	mean	that	competitive	neutrality	prevents	the	public	sector	from	successfully	competing	
with	the	private	sector	or	hinders	SOEs	from	meeting	its	public	service	obligations	and	other	
given	responsibilities.	Competitive	neutrality	is	in	place	to	ensure	a	level	playing	field	where	
government	businesses	can	only	win	other	market	participants	through	their	own	efforts	
and	intrinsic	growth,	not	as	a	consequent	outcome	of	being	a	government-owned	business	
entity.	
Since	the	first	time	being	implemented	in	Australia	in	1996,	competitive	neutrality	has	
become	ubiquitous	being	widely	adopted	all	 over	 the	world	 (Lane,	1997).	 Some	modern	
competitive	neutrality	 disciplines	 recently	 have	been	established	 in	 a	wider	 context	of	 a	
small	number	of	nations	in	a	particular	region	like	PTAs	or	BITs.	However,	most	competitive	
neutrality	frameworks	so	far	have	been	created	just	for	domestic	markets,	or	in	other	words,	
between	government	business	enterprises	and	private	businesses	operating	in	the	same	na-
tional	economy	only	such	as	OECD	Guidelines,	national	competition	laws,	WTO	agreements	
etc.	There	are	numerous	sources	of	information	for	governments	to	build	their	own	com-
petitive	neutrality	frameworks	which	have	different	requirements.	While	some	can	be	re-
garded	as	references	without	compulsory	binding	such	as	National	Competitive	Neutrality	
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Framework	(Australia,	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	United	States	are	highly	successful	over-
all),	OECD	Guidelines,	etc.	 some	must	be	 legally	binding	by	 the	member	nations	 like	 the	
WTO,	Preferential	Trade	Agreements	(PTAs)	and	Bilateral	Investment	Treaties	(BITs)2.	There-
fore,	it	 is	clear	that	the	implementation	of	competitive	neutrality	in	a	given	country	is	af-
fected	by	two	legal	sources,	which	are	the	international	agreements	from	the	organizations	
that	country	commit	to;	and	the	national	legal	framework	concerning	competitive	neutrality	
of	that	country.	In	which,	normally	agreements	referring	to	competitive	neutrality	from	in-
ternational	organization	lay	the	fundamental	background	for	a	level	playing	field	while	the	
competitive	neutrality	law	and	policy	of	that	particular	country	exerts	a	comprehensive	legal	
regime	with	detailed	statements	and	provisions	for	real	implementation.	From	that,	the	ef-
forts	to	achieve	competitive	neutrality	are	divided	into	three	methods,	which	are	(1)	to	gain	
competitive	 neutrality	 by	 domestic	 legislation;	 (2)	 to	 stimulate	 competitive	 neutrality	
through	"Best	Practices"	or	"Guidelines"	published	by	 international	organizations	 (mainly	
OECD/UNCTAD/ICN,	etc.)	in	an	international	scale;	(3)	to	form	binding	competitive	neutrality	
regulations	through	Regional	Trade	Agreements	(RTAs)	or	Free	Trade	Agreements	(FTAs).	
III.	BRIEF	ASPECTS	OF	COMPETITIVE	NEUTRALITY	
Given	different	economic	contexts	of	countries	in	the	world,	the	way	governments	ap-
proaching	and	addressing	competitive	neutrality	in	their	market	varies	from	nation	to	na-
tion.	The	competitive	neutrality	between	public	and	private	entities	is	established	through	
eight	elements	mostly	based	on	the	Working	Paper	of	OECD	(OECD	2012a).	
1.	Streamlining	the	operational	form	of	government	business		
The	operational	practices	and	the	legal	form	under	which	the	state-owned	sector	op-
erates	have	significant	indications	for	competitive	neutrality.	It	will	be	easier	for	competitive	
neutrality	to	be	implemented	if	business	activities	are	carried	out	by	independent	commer-
cial	entities	that	are	 less	affected	by	the	directions	of	the	general	government.	However,	
competitive	neutrality	law	is	defined	as	a	regulation	system	which	aims	at	setting	up	a	level	
playing	field	for	all	market	participants	regardless	of	their	ownership	status,	therefore,	SOEs	
which	are	founded	under	political	orientation	of	the	government	may	impede	the	applica-
tions	of	competitive	neutrality.	The	pursuant	of	competitive	neutrality	through	the	separa-
tion	process	can	be	standardized	into	four	stages.	Firstly,	a	structural	separation	of	compet-
itive	from	non-competitive	operations	where	feasible	and	efficient	should	be	carried	out.	It	
means	the	division	of	a	previously	integrated	entity	into	competitive	and	non-competitive	
parts,	normally	in	terms	of	technologies,	capital	equipment,	human	capital,	etc.	Secondly,	it	
                                                
2 Agreement between JAPAN and VIET NAM for the liberation, promotion and protection of Investment, Art 
4, 1 (g), retrieved from: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/vietnam/agree0311.pdf; or EU-Vietnam Free 
Trade Agreement, Chapter 8: Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce, retrieved from: http://trade.ec.eu-
ropa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154210.pdf. 
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is	equally	important	to	come	up	with	an	optimal	form	for	government	business	activities.	
The	‘optimal	form”	of	government	business	will	be	decided	depending	on	the	commercial	
activity’s	level	of	integration	with	the	public	institutions	as	well	as	the	careful	consideration	
on	the	boundary	between	the	government-oriented	role	and	purely	commercial	activities	of	
SOEs.	The	third	step	is	setting	out	clear	objectives	to	increase	transparency	and	accounta-
bility.	The	first	two	steps	are	carried	out	to	transform	the	operation	of	government	business,	
under	that	general	goals,	specific	objectives	must	be	set	up	for	the	new	business	entity	to	
follow.	Finally,	the	fourth	stage	is	periodic	review	of	continued	government	stake	in	business	
activities	in	order	to	maintain	the	effectiveness	of	the	separation	process.	
With	reference	to	the	operational	form	of	government	business,	the	public	sector	has	
experienced	contrasting	development	trends	recently.	It	is	the	case	in	almost	all	countries	
in	the	world	that	there	are	clear	improvements	in	the	completion	of	the	corporatization	of	
commercial	activities.	It	is	supported	by	real	evidence	that	an	increasing	number	of	public	
institutions	ranging	from	government	departments,	statutory	corporations,	and	joint	-	stock	
companies	to	stock	market	listing	have	all	taken	actions	in	the	direction	of	enhanced	trans-
parency	and	accountability.	On	the	other	hand,	a	number	of	business	activities	have	been	
exerted	with	competitive	economy	due	to	market	liberalization,	especially	in	the	utility	sec-
tor	and	network	industries	(for	example,	telecommunications,	postal	service,	electricity	and	
transport)	that	were	traditionally	considered	as	natural	monopoly.	
Structural	separation	of	business	activities	is	a	ubiquitous	trend	among	governments	
all	over	the	world,	in	which	the	competitive	and	non-competitive	parts	of	government	busi-
ness	are	separated	and	competition	in	the	market	segments	of	the	competitive	parts	will	be	
encouraged.	From	this	point	of	view,	the	process	of	structural	separation	is	clearly	in	favor	
of	the	establishment	of	competitive	neutrality.	However,	in	the	real	world,	this	process	may	
not	always	possible	as	it	cannot	be	applied	in	some	kinds	of	particular	markets,	for	instance,	
intertwined	production	processes	or	dependence	on	the	same	physical	or	human	capital.	
Sometimes,	the	separation	process	cannot	be	carried	out	as	an	adequate	level	of	public	ser-
vices	needs	to	be	kept	in	order	to	response	to	market	failure	or	fulfil	the	given	public	policy	
function.	Besides,	even	when	the	separation	process	in	feasible,	it	cannot	be	put	into	action	
when	it	does	not	satisfy	the	efficiency	grounds	meaning	that	the	cost	does	not	outweigh	the	
benefits	it	brings	back	to	the	economy.		
2.	Identifying	the	costs	of	any	given	function		
Competitive	neutrality	can	only	be	achieved	when	the	remuneration	for	public	service	
obligations	are	calculated	based	on	clear	targets	and	objectives	meaning	that	the	public	sec-
tor	will	only	be	paid	a	reasonable	amount	of	money	for	fulfilling	the	responsibility	given	by	
the	government.	In	order	to	achieve	that,	all	costs	arising	from	the	business	activities	of	SOEs	
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must	be	recognized	through	high	standards	of	transparency	and	disclosure.	When	it	is	pos-
sible	to	identify	the	costs	of	any	given	function	and	to	develop	appropriate	cost	allocation	
mechanism,	competitive	neutrality	also	becomes	possible	as	the	compensation	provided	for	
SOEs	cannot	be	used	as	conduit	to	cross-subsidies	commercial	activities.	
When	 commercial	 and	 non-commercial	 activities	 are	 integrated	 in	 the	 government	
business,	they	usually	share	the	costs,	and/or	assets,	 liabilities,	which	can	result	 in	unfair	
competitive	advantages	in	the	markets.	The	compensation	for	public	service	obligations	of	
SOEs	can	be	utilized	not	only	 in	 the	relevant	markets,	but	also	 in	other	markets	 that	 the	
public	sector	enters.	The	financial	support	from	the	authority,	together	with	lowered	costs	
of	business	operation	due	to	scale	of	economies	allowing	the	SOEs	to	price	more	aggres-
sively	than	their	competitors.	It	obviously	goes	against	the	principle	of	competitive	neutral-
ity,	hence,	identifying	the	costs	of	any	given	function	is	one	of	the	central	aspects	of	com-
petitive	neutrality	implementation.		
In	order	to	identify	whether	the	costs	emerging	from	competitive	or	non-competitive	
business	practices,	competitive	neutrality	must	follow	certain	budget	principles	of	general	
business	activities.	In	fact,	there	are	3	rules	which	are	given	by	OECD	and	are	carefully	fol-
lowed	by	its	members.	The	first	rule	to	government	business	is	that	commercial	and	non-
commercial	activities	are	integrated,	fully	disclosing	of	direct	and	indirect	shared	costs	and	
assets	should	be	required	and	taken	into	account.	The	second	rule	refers	to	the	transparency	
of	surrounding	costs	in	terms	of	where	are	they	going	to	and	how	they	are	going	to	be	used.	
When	public	enterprises	are	granted	access	to	the	public	funds	in	the	direction	of	services	
of	general	public	interests,	the	source	and	usage	of	them	should	be	made	transparent.	The	
third	rule	suggests	that	in	order	to	gain	competitive	neutrality	in	the	market	place,	any	costs	
advantages	 or	 disadvantages	 originated	 from	 the	 public	 ownership	 status	 should	 be	 re-
moved.		
The	ability	to	identify	the	cost	structure	of	SOEs	is	not	only	correlative	with	the	theo-
retical	principles	of	competitive	neutrality	but	it	also	enhances	the	effectiveness	of	compet-
itive	neutrality	legal	enforcement.	The	process	to	identify	all	the	costs	of	any	given	function	
in	the	direction	of	competitive	neutrality	law	and	policies	contains	4	following	stages.	The	
first	stage	involves	the	transparency	and	disclose	of	the	cost	structure	of	the	targeted	cor-
poratized	business	entity.	It	should	also	be	noted	here	that	the	use	of	public	resources	to	
cover	the	costs	of	business	activities	of	government-owned	enterprises	be	disclosed	to	the	
relevant	regulatory	authorities	and	to	the	general	public	to	the	largest	extent	possible.	In	
the	second	stage,	under	the	scrutiny	of	both	the	official	authority	and	the	public,	the	sepa-
ration	of	costs	and	assets	for	commercial	and	non-commercial	activities	should	be	clearly	
scrutinized.	The	third	stage	is	when	all	the	liabilities	of	the	government	business	are	clearly	
attributed.	This	is	not	an	easy	task	as	the	liability	structure	of	a	SOE	operating	in	both	public	
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service	and	other	activities	is	more	complex	than	a	private	enterprise	as	it	may	include	vari-
ous	kinds	of	liabilities	which	may	never	appear	in	a	private	entity.	Finally,	the	fourth	stage	
completes	the	competitive	neutrality	goal	of	the	whole	process,	coming	close	to	the	impli-
cations	of	competitive	neutrality	by	controlling	and	making	cost	neutrality	adjustments.	The	
level	of	transparency	and	accountability	will	be	maintained	to	ensure	the	information	output	
for	cost-neutralizing	decisions	being	given	in	the	changing	economic	context.	
3.	Commercial	rate	of	return		
When	government	businesses	are	put	under	social	pressure	of	satisfying	the	commu-
nity	service,	the	requirements	for	their	operational	efficiency	is	not	so	high	in	order	to	com-
pensate	for	the	obligation	that	they	have	to	carry.	However,	competitive	neutrality	imple-
mentation	which	is	for	a	level	playing	field	for	commercial	entities	in	the	market	demands	a	
reasonable	rate	of	return	from	the	business	activities	of	SOEs.	Adopting	a	set	of	commercial	
rate	of	 return	 for	 separate	 line	of	 commercial	 activities	of	governmental	enterprises	 can	
prevent	the	distorting	cross-subsidization	practices	while	that	also	plays	the	role	as	a	tool	of	
healthy	competition	in	the	economy.	To	the	markets	where	government-owned	businesses	
present	the	social	and	political	orientations	of	the	official	authority,	relevant	rate	of	return	
should	also	be	set	to	ensure	the	effectiveness	of	the	performance.	A	set	of	market-consistent	
rates	 of	 return	 is	 required	 for	 commercial	 and	 non-commercial	 activities	 of	 government	
businesses	in	practice	to	justify	the	long-term	retention	on	assets	and	capital	from	the	public	
funds.	Nonetheless,	it	should	also	be	noted	that	it	is	never	an	easy	task	to	determine	the	
appropriate	rate	of	return	for	a	targeted	government	business.	The	adequate	rate	of	return	
has	to	balance	the	level	of	risk	of	the	particular	business	and	the	standardized	commercial	
rate	of	return	of	that	industry	over	a	sufficient	period	of	time.	Given	the	particular	economic	
context,	the	difficulties	in	determining	the	appropriate	rate	of	return	also	come	from	the	
availability	and	credibility	of	accounting	information	concerning	the	business	operation	of	
government-owned	enterprises.		
Setting	a	commercial	rate	of	return	target	helps	to	examine	the	competitiveness	and	
assess	the	performance	ensuring	that	competitive	neutrality	principles	be	followed	so	that	
the	public	sector	is	operating	under	the	same	pressure	as	comparable	businesses.	The	pro-
cess	of	achieving	a	commercial	rate	of	return	includes	3	stages.	The	first	step	is	to	identify	
the	government	businesses	where	commercial	activities	 involve	because	they	will	be	 the	
objects	for	commercial	rate	of	return	targets	to	be	set.	In	the	second	step,	before	the	com-
mercial	rate	of	return	to	be	enacted,	commercial	and	non-commercial	part	of	business	prac-
tices	of	SOEs	have	to	be	made	transparent.	All	kinds	of	government	business	activities	may	
be	 required	 to	 complete	 their	 responsibilities	 rather	 than	 to	pursue	 the	maximization	of	
profit.	The	transparency	between	competitive	and	non-competitive	business	activities	ex-
cludes	the	possibility	that	commercial	rate	of	return	target	keeps	SOEs	in	line	with	compet-
itive	neutrality	 law	without	undercutting	actual	or	potential	competition.	Lastly,	the	third	
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step	stresses	on	the	fact	that	commercial	rate	of	return	is	based	on	benchmarks	across	in-
dustry	standards,	however	appropriate	adjustments	can	be	made	taking	into	account	public	
service	obligations	that	the	targeted	public	business	entity	have	to	meet	in	the	given	eco-
nomic	environment.	
4.	Accounting	for	public	service	obligations		
Governments	have	a	number	of	ways	to	support	their	owned	enterprises	with	the	com-
pensation	methods	depending	on	the	country,	the	kind	of	public	service	and	the	business	
entity	delivering	such	service.	Normally,	the	most	noticeable	mode	of	compensation	for	pub-
lic	service	obligations	is	payments	that	are	directly	derived	from	the	public	funds	as	the	fi-
nancial	aids	for	the	additional	costs	arising	from	non-commercial	requirements	of	the	gov-
ernment.	Moreover,	there	is	also	a	concern	that	compensations	for	the	supply	of	public	ser-
vice	can	be	abused	as	a	conduit	for	unintended	cross-subsidization	of	commercial	activities	
by	the	same	entity.	Hence,	despite	the	good	will	behind	such	compensations	for	public	ser-
vice	obligations,	 that	 imposes	 challenges	 for	 competitive	neutrality	 implications	 to	 accu-
rately	calibrate	compensation	to	minimize	any	distortionary	effects	on	the	market.		
Although	thorough	evaluation	of	the	performance	of	public	policy	function	can	have	
enormous	impacts	on	the	implementation	of	competitive	neutrality,	it	is	not	an	easy	task	to	
any	official	competitive	authority	in	the	world.	In	order	to	take	into	serious	consideration	
the	role	to	provide	public	services	of	SOEs	in	the	direction	of	a	level	playing	field,	countries	
are	advised	to	follow	the	four	following	steps.	The	first	step	is	to	ensure	a	sufficient	degree	
of	transparency	and	accountability	around	government	businesses’	use	of	public	budget	to	
satisfy	public	service	needs.	A	sufficient	degree	of	transparency	and	disclosure	surrounding	
the	use	of	public	budgets	will	be	the	input	information	for	budget	oversight	and	monitoring.	
Then	comes	the	second	step	of	ensuring	that	adequate	compensation	is	provided	in	the	dis-
charge	of	public	service	obligations	entrusted	to	SOEs.	In	the	third	step,	compensation	for	
public	service	obligations	should	be	made	disbursed	and	spend	in	a	manner	which	can	be	
accounted	for	separately.	Lastly,	the	fourth	step	makes	it	clear	that,	with	reference	to	com-
petitive	neutrality,	public	service	suppliers	should	neither	be	put	at	a	competitive	advantage,	
nor	have	their	competitive	activities	effectively	subsidized	by	the	state.	
As	mentioned	earlier,	accounting	for	public	service	obligations	should	be	considered	as	
one	of	the	essential	elements	to	countries	committed	to	competitive	neutrality.	Therefore,	
in	the	efforts	of	promoting	healthy	competitive	environment	all	over	the	world,	OECD	has	
suggested	3	approaches	in	achieving	accounting	neutrality	(OECD	2012),	which	are:	(i)	de-
termining	adequate	compensation	 in	fulfilling	public	service	obligations;	 (ii)	ensuring	that	
compensation	does	not	amount	to	undue	subsidies;	and	(iii)	determining	a	neutral	compen-
sation	methods	to	follow.	Equal	consideration	should	be	given	to	not	only	above	mentioned	
issues	such	as	streamlining	 the	operational	 form	of	government	business,	 identifying	 the	
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costs	of	any	given	function,	setting	commercial	rate	of	return,	and	accounting	for	public	ser-
vice	obligations,	but	also	other	aspects	of	competitive	neutrality	as	below.	
5.	Tax	neutrality	
Tax	advantages	for	the	public	sector	is	also	one	of	the	major	challenges	of	the	imple-
mentation	of	competitive	neutrality.	It	is	the	common	situation	in	many	countries	that	pub-
lic,	private	and	other	sectors	face	different	tax	treatment	owing	to	their	ownership	status	or	
legal	form.	Tax	advantages	or	tax	disadvantages	come	from	a	wide	range	of	direct	or	indirect	
tax	regime	including	corporate/	income	taxes,	value-added	taxes	(VAT),	property	taxes,	reg-
istration,	and	other	 special	 taxes.	Preferable	 tax	 treatment	can	often	be	seen	 in	SOEs	 to	
compensate	for	the	social	and	political	responsibility	that	they	have	to	meet.	When	tax	ad-
vantages	are	spotted,	usually	 in	 the	 form	of	 lower	 tax	 rate	or	 tax	exemption,	 the	official	
authority	have	to	understand	to	what	extent	these	tax	advantages	cause	distortions	or	re-
straints	of	open	competition	in	the	marketplace.	From	that,	governments	can	take	appro-
priate	actions	in	the	efforts	of	setting	up	a	level	playing	field	in	their	economy.	
If	tax	advantages	significantly	exert	harmful	effects	to	the	fair	competition	in	the	mar-
ket,	which	is	mostly	the	case	of	a	number	of	nations	in	the	world,	tax	neutrality	will	be	re-
quired	to	set	up	and	maintain.	Following	is	the	three	fundamental	principles	of	tax	neutrality	
proposed	by	OECD	with	heavy	 focus	on	value-added	 taxation	system,	which	are	used	by	
economies	targeting	the	establishment	of	competitive	neutrality	not	only	as	a	legal	frame-
work	but	also	in	real	practice.	Firstly,	in	cross-border	trade,	businesses	in	similar	situations	
carrying	out	similar	transactions	should	be	imposed	similar	levels	of	value-added	taxation	
from	OECD	International	VAT/GST	Guidelines3.	Secondly,	in	cross-border	trade	where	spe-
cific	administrative	requirements	of	foreign	businesses	are	deemed	necessary,	value-added	
tax	should	be	administered	in	a	way	which	does	not	create	disproportionate	or	inappropri-
ate	compliance	costs	for	business	from	the	same	OECD	source.	Thirdly,	it	should	be	made	
that	transparency	surrounding	tax	exemptions	and	rectify	possible	advantages	are	associ-
ated	with	them.	
Although,	tax	neutrality	is	another	tough	aspect	of	competitive	neutrality,	it	is	totally	
worth	considering	and	making	efforts.	The	establishment	of	tax	neutrality	will	substantially	
enhance	the	implementation	of	competitive	neutrality	as	all	business	entities	regardless	of	
their	ownership	structure	will	be	treated	in	an	equal	manner	in	terms	of	tax.	In	other	words,	
tax	neutrality	ensures	that	the	public	sector	faces	the	same	tax	burden	as	their	competitor’s	
counterpart.	In	order	to	achieve	that,	there	are	two	approaches,	which	are:	(i)	evaluating	
the	direct	and	indirect	taxes	with	reference	to	compensation	for	public	service	obligation;	
(ii)	adopting	tax	neutrality	adjustments	and	other	forms	of	compensation.	
                                                
3 OECD International Guidelines on Neutrality 2015, retrieved from: https://www.oecd.org/ctp/consumption/in-
ternational-vat-gst-guidelines.pdf 
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6.	Regulatory	neutrality	
The	concern	for	uneven	regulatory	treatment	between	public	and	private	sectors	has	
been	widespread	to	all	parts	of	the	global	economy	for	quite	a	long	time.	Government	busi-
nesses	can	abuse	the	regulatory	incentives	that	they	are	granted	to	compete	with	their	com-
petitors	in	an	unfair	manner	causing	restraints	or	even	distortions	to	the	perfectly	competi-
tive	environment.	Further	problems	can	also	emerge	when	competitive	neutrality	 imple-
mentation	deals	with	unincorporated	government	entities	(or	entities	incorporated	accord-
ing	to	a	tailored	legal	framework)	as	the	regulatory	advantages	for	such	entities	come	from	
their	integration	with	the	executive	power.	The	provisions	of	restrictive	business	practices	
under	 enforcement	 applied	 to	 SOEs	 and	 to	 other	 sectors.	 Other	 types	 of	 regulatory	 ad-
vantages	conferred	to	SOEs	consist	of	preferential	treatment	in	terms	of	disclosure	or	con-
forming	with	other	requirements,	sovereign	 immunity	 laws,	bankruptcy	 laws,	compliance	
with	start-up	administrative	requirements	and	favorable	access	to	land.	Regulatory	prefer-
ences	are	usually	disguised	under	2	reasons	which	are	(i)	the	concerned	government	busi-
ness	operates	in	an	area	involving	a	natural	monopoly;	(ii)	preferential	regulatory	treatment	
is	needed	to	compensate	SOEs	for	public	service	obligation.		
The	existence	of	regulatory	differences	between	public	and	private	business	practices	
can	totally	be	a	serious	obstacle	to	the	implementation	of	competitive	neutrality.	Therefore,	
together	with	above	mentioned	contents,	it	is	apparent	that	achieving	regulatory	neutrality	
is	mutually	consistent	with	competitive	neutrality	law	and	policy,	which	will	be	illustrated	
through	the	fundamental	principles	of	regulatory	neutrality.	The	first	and	maybe,	the	fore-
most	principle	of	regulatory	neutrality	is	that	an	equal	regulatory	treatment	should	be	en-
sured	between	the	public	and	private	businesses.	Although	regulatory	exemptions	can	be	
granted	to	SOEs	to	compensate	for	their	public	service	responsibility,	competitive	neutrality	
is	in	place	to	ensure	the	same	treatment	for	other	types	of	businesses.	The	second	compet-
itive	neutrality	rule	relating	to	regulatory	neutrality	is	that	the	participation	of	the	govern-
ment	in	the	market	should	be	evaluated	periodically.	Given	the	changing	nature	of	the	global	
economy	 in	general	and	of	 the	national	economy	 in	particular,	government	participation	
should	be	adjusted	according	to	the	changes	in	the	market.	The	third	principle	reflects	com-
petitive	neutrality	policy	that	regulatory	preferences	have	to	be	consistent	and	neutral	re-
gardless	of	ownership	status.	Finally,	regulatory	measures	are	not	the	only	tool	of	achieving	
regulatory	neutrality,	a	multi-disciplinary	approach	also	acts	as	a	decisive	factor.	
7.	Debt	neutrality	and	outright	subsidies	
So	far,	due	to	the	globalization	trend	and	the	commitment	to	international	agreements,	
the	financial	support	of	the	state	to	enterprises	of	its	ownership	has	been	dramatically	re-
duced,	especially	the	apparent	financial	assistants	such	as	the	outright	subsidies	to	commer-
cial	activities	of	SOEs.	Public	companies	are	subject	to	the	same	regulatory	frameworks	and	
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lending	conditions	as	private	sector	firms.	However,	it	cannot	be	denied	that	government-
owned	businesses	still	benefit	from	a	few	exceptions	applied	to	this	sector,	as	to	some	loss-
making	public	companies	or	other	kinds	of	government-controlled	entities	which	are	too	big	
to	fail,	the	official	authority	has	to	grant	the	financial	aids	to	sustain	their	commercial	oper-
ation.	The	effects	of	debt	neutrality	and	outright	subsidies	to	the	government-owned	sector	
is	not	only	being	represented	through	official	written	regulations	but	also	come	from	un-
written	rules	in	the	market.	Owing	to	government	backing,	which	can	be	in	the	form	of	im-
plicit,	explicit	or	perceived	guarantees	or	in	the	kind	of	exceptional	case	laws,	the	real	ben-
efits	for	SOEs	from	government	financial	support	are	very	hard	to	measure,	for	example	they	
are	offered	lower	interest	rate	in	the	financial	market.	As	a	consequence,	undesirable	out-
comes	 to	 the	competitive	environment	emerge	when	 loans	 for	SOEs	are	available	below	
market	interest	rates	or	against	collateral	or	securitization	that	is	unacceptable	situation	un-
der	purely	commercial	terms.	
	Like	the	above-mentioned	aspects	of	competitive	neutrality,	the	establishment	of	debt	
neutrality	and	outright	subsidies	among	all	market	participants	irrespective	of	their	owner-
ship	relations	or	legal	forms	requires	some	rules	to	be	followed.	The	first	essential	principle	
of	debt	neutrality	 is	 that	preferential	 treatment	 from	financial	perspective	should	not	be	
granted	to	SOEs	in	the	first	place.	Equally	important,	it	should	also	be	noted	that	debt	neu-
trality	adjustments	should	be	put	 into	practice	whenever	unfair	 financial	 favor	 is	spotted	
under	the	particular	economic	situation.	The	principles	of	debt	neutrality	and	outright	sub-
sidies	are	obviously	reflected	in	the	approach	to	achieve	that	not	just	in	paper	but	in	the	real	
world.	Given	different	economic	context,	the	debt	neutrality	situation	of	countries	 in	the	
world	varies	from	countries	to	countries,	therefore,	any	governments	who	wish	to	pursue	
competitive	neutrality	have	to	assess	their	debt	on	neutral	term	by	their	own.	When	debt	
neutrality	situation	cannot	be	accessed,	governments	can	put	into	practice	a	system	of	debt	
neutrality	 adjustments.	 For	 instance,	 SOEs	 may	 be	 required	 to	 pay	 for	 “debt	 neutrality	
charge”	which	is	the	difference	between	the	real	interest	rate	and	the	cost	of	the	debt	that	
they	have	to	pay	for.	
8.	Public	procurement	
Close	relations	with	the	government	have	powered	the	SOEs’	voice	resulting	in	their	
significant	impacts	on	a	number	of	processes	in	the	market	mechanism	such	as	outsourcing,	
tendering,	concessions,	and	other	forms	of	public-private	partnerships).	Hence,	in	order	to	
open	the	fair	competition	in	the	marketplace	between	the	public	sector	and	other	sectors,	
national	public	procurement	policy	is	the	option	that	was	chosen	by	most	countries.	Under	
perfect	competitive	process,	the	existence	of	unfair	advantages	that	incumbents	or	in-house	
providers	may	have	in	the	bidding	process	clearly	has	negative	influences	to	the	competitive	
environment.	These	advantages	consist	of	 the	following:	a	stronger	position	to	negotiate	
their	business	transaction	where	a	given	SOE	has	already	set	up	a	track	record;	government	
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businesses	also	benefit	from	access	to	confidential	 information	such	as	service	levels	and	
costs;	and	lower	start-up	and	transitional	costs	compared	with	potential	entrants	–	particu-
larly	when	contract	period	is	limited.	Other	more	serious	problems	which	are	illicit	practices	
have	also	been	claimed	for	instance,	corruption,	bid	rigging,	abusive	related	party	transac-
tions	and	other	unethical	behavior	by	sellers	in	public	procurement.		
Public	procurement	is	the	last	one	in	eight	crucial	elements	of	competitive	neutrality	
chosen	to	be	presented	in	this	paper.	However,	the	role	of	public	procurement	in	competi-
tive	 neutrality	 implementation	 is	 not	 less	 important	 than	 any	 above-mentioned	 factors.	
There	are	several	principles	for	public	procurement	in	the	direction	of	competitive	neutral-
ity.	Firstly,	public	procurement	should	be	a	fair	competitive	process	under	perfect	market	
mechanism	to	ensure	the	original	goal	of	public	procurement	that	is	public	welfare	maximi-
zation.	Secondly,	it	has	to	be	made	clear	from	public	procurement	policies	and	procedures	
that	transparency	and	equitable	treatment	have	to	be	maintained	through	clear	selection	
criteria	and	fair	consideration.	Thirdly,	all	public	entities,	including	in-house	bidders,	partic-
ipating	in	a	bidding	process	should	operate	according	to	standards	of	competitive	neutrality.	
Fourthly,	and	also	lastly,	moral	values	are	vital	in	public	procurement	processes.	From	that,	
the	approaches	to	competitive	neutrality	from	public	procurement	perspective	have	to	fol-
low	all	these	principles:		
(i)	 Public	 procurement	processes	 satisfy	 the	 following	 criteria	being	 consistent	with	
competitive	neutrality	which	are	equal	 treatment,	non-discrimination,	 transparency,	pro-
portionality,	mutual	recognition.		
(ii)	Public	procurement	procedure	acknowledge	and	take	into	consideration	all	the	dif-
ferences	between	participated	bidders.		
(iii)	It	is	necessary	to	set	up	ex-post	complaints	mechanisms	and	correcting	measures	
to	deal	with	non-neutrality	discovered	after	a	public	procurement	process	has	been	initi-
ated.	
IV.	EXPERIENCE	OF	COMPETITIVE	NEUTRALITY	IN	SELECTED	COUNTRIES		
1.	Competitive	neutrality	in	Australia	
a)	The	competitive	neutrality	policy	and	principles	of	Australia		
In	the	early	1990s,	 in	order	to	contend	with	the	present	problems	from	the	harmful	
practices	of	government	business	enterprises	to	the	healthy	competition	in	the	market,	Aus-
tralian	Government	decided	to	set	up	an	official	legal	framework	controlling	state	business	
activities	(Loundes,	1998).	Thus,	it	is	stated	that	by	1996	each	party	of	the	Australian	Gov-
ernment	be	required	to	enact	a	policy	statement	on	competitive	neutrality	which	is	most	
compatible	with	its	current	circumstance	with	assistance	from	the	Council	(Hollander,	2016).	
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Being	formally	adopted	in	1992	by	the	Commonwealth,	States	and	Territories,	the	Na-
tional	Competition	Policy	is	a	legal	set	of	reforms	with	the	aim	to	improve	Australia’s	com-
petitiveness	in	the	international	arena.	Competitive	neutrality	is	one	among	7	cornerstones	
of	the	National	Competition	Policy	of	Australia.	From	Australian	Government’s	legal	frame-
work,	competitive	neutrality	is	defined	as	a	level	playing	field	where	significant	business	ac-
tivities	should	not	take	advantage	of	their	net	competitive	advantages	over	other	market	
participants	solely	because	of	their	government	ownership4.	“Significant	business	activity”	
is	defined	as	the	business	activity	of	significant	business	organizations	which	are	all	publicly	
owned	entities	and	their	subsidiaries,	other	share-limited	trading	companies,	and	all	desig-
nated	business	units.	To	be	considered	as	a	“business	activity”,	three	requirements	have	to	
be	met:	the	user	pays	for	the	goods	or	services,	it	is	illegal	to	limit	the	choices	of	users,	the	
product	price	 can	be	decided	 to	 some	extent	by	managers	of	 the	business	 activity	 (Ray,	
2000).	The	goal	of	maintaining	competitive	neutrality	in	the	market	is	to	eliminate	the	ma-
nipulations	of	resource	allocations	granted	to	publicly	owned	enterprises	carried	out	signif-
icant	business	activities.	However,	 it	 is	also	clearly	 stated	 that	 the	competitive	neutrality	
policy	and	principles	only	apply	to	business	activities	of	SOEs,	not	for	non-business	or	non-
profit	activities	of	them	(Fels,	1996).		
The	competitive	neutrality	legal	framework	of	Australia	has	been	generated	with	strict	
policies	and	principles.	They	are	enacted	with	detailed	guidelines	and	methods	to	measure	
their	 effectiveness	 of	 a	 particular	 Australian	 Government.	 Australian	 Government	 can	
choose	 the	most	appropriate	set	of	competitive	neutrality	policies	 to	apply	and	 they	are	
required	 to	 report	 about	 the	 implementation	 of	 competitive	 neutrality	 annually	 as	well.	
There	are	three	policies	in	the	implementation	of	competitive	neutrality	in	Australia,	which	
are	corporatization,	commercialization	and	full	cost-reflective	pricing	(Eggers,	1998).		
Corporatization	is	the	method	of	gaining	competitive	neutrality	applied	for	the	councils	
which	possess	and	run	the	main	trading	businesses.	After	being	corporatized,	publicly	owned	
entities	are	regarded	as	government-owned	corporations	(GOC).	To	be	more	specific,	the	
method	of	corporatization	is	the	separation	out	of	the	business	unit	which	is	the	monopoly	
element	of	the	whole	government	business	enterprises,	creating	a	separate	legal	entity.	As	
a	 result,	 corporatization	helps	 to	neutralize	 the	excessive	power	of	government	business	
enterprises	in	the	market	while	the	business	activities	and	financial	performance	of	the	new	
GOC	are	better	controlled	by	the	Australian	Government.		
The	true	essence	and	fundamental	principles	of	corporatization	and	commercialization	
are	the	same	but	the	difference	is	a	matter	of	degree	(Commonwealth	Secretariat,	2004).	
While	the	corporatization	reform	generates	a	separate	legal	entity,	commercialized	activi-
ties	can	only	 lead	to	the	establishment	of	 internal	business	units.	 In	fact,	commercialized	
                                                
4  Commonwealth Competitive Neutrality Statement, 1996, retrieved from: http://archive.treasury.gov.au/-doc-
uments/275/PDF/cnps.pdf 
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activities	 can	be	 conducted	during	 the	process	of	 corporatization	as	 a	 transitional	 stage.	
There	are	three	steps	in	the	commercialization	method:	creating	a	general	business	environ-
ment	between	customers	and	suppliers;	generating	official	 trading	relationships	 in	a	 tied	
playground;	and	lastly,	forming	a	commercial	environment	where	customers	have	more	con-
siderably	free	to	make	their	choice	of	suppliers	(Harman,	1996).		
The	third	competitive	neutrality	measure	is	the	full	cost-reflective	pricing	which	apply	
for	neither	GOCs	nor	wholly	commercialized	business	units.	The	underlying	principle	of	the	
full	cost-reflective	pricing	policy	is	that	the	councils’	target	should	be	to	accurately	estimate	
the	full	costs	of	their	business	activities,	which	includes	all	the	costs	to	produce	the	goods	or	
services	and	the	costs	of	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	their	ownership.	By	that,	compet-
itive	neutrality	is	ensured	as	GOCs	and	separate	business	units	face	the	same	structure	of	
cost	as	their	private	competitors	in	the	market,	meaning	that	they	are	under	the	same	pres-
sure	of	competition.		
In	Australia’s	competitive	neutrality	legal	framework,	competitive	neutrality	is	main-
tained	with	the	objective	of	limiting	any	net	advantages	that	SOEs	enjoy	as	a	result	of	their	
state	 ownership.	 In	 order	 to	 achieve	 competitive	 neutrality,	 Australian	 Government	 has	
adopted	competitive	neutrality	principles	to	make	sure	significant	business	activities	having	
the	prices	that	fully	reflect	the	costs	in	comparison	with	other	market	sectors.		
There	are	5	competitive	neutrality	principles	enacted	that	influence	the	cost	structure	
of	significant	business	activities	in	that	direction.	
-	Tax	neutrality:	 The	main	objective	of	 the	 tax	neutrality	principle	 is	 that	 significant	
business	activities	and	other	business	activities	are	treated	in	equal	manners	in	terms	of	tax.	
In	other	words,	government	business	enterprises	and	other	business	entities	have	to	take	
into	account	the	same	proportion	of	tax	payment	in	their	price.	Under	competitive	neutrality	
regime,	there	are	3	broad	kinds	of	tax:	i)	direct	taxes;	ii)	Commonwealth	indirect	taxes;	and	
iii)	State	taxes	(including	local	government	taxes).	There	are	also	3	methods	that	Australia	
governments	can	use	to	neutralize	tax	advantages	of	government	business	enterprises:	Ac-
tual	tax,	Taxation	Equivalent	Regime,	Taxation	Neutrality	Adjustments	(Deitz,	2012).	The	first	
system	 is	 applied	 for	 Commonwealth	 Authorities	 and	 Companies	 (CAC)	 Act	 bodies	 only,	
while	private	sectors	have	to	pay	for	Commonwealth,	State	and	local	taxes,	the	government	
makes	arrangements	to	make	sure	government	business	enterprises	are	subject	to	the	same	
tax	burden	(Department	of	Finance	and	Administration,	2004).	Tax	equivalent	regime	is	sub-
ject	 to	all	Business	Units,	 significant	business	activities	of	Financial	Management	and	Ac-
countability	Act	agents	and	not-for-profit	CAC	Act	bodies,	CAC	Act	bodies	that	receive	tax	
exemptions.	The	second	tax	neutralizing	system	that	requires	government	business	activi-
ties	to	pay	an	equivalent	tax	payment	which	eliminates	their	tax	advantages.	The	last	system	
is	for	all	public	sector	bids	and	others	to	make	sure	all	market	participants	are	under	equal	
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tax	liabilities.	Taxation	Neutrality	Adjustments	impose	taxes	based	on	the	baseline	costing	
with	the	aim	of	fair	tax	burdens	on	all	market	testing	activities	(Deitz,	2012).		
-	 Debt	 neutrality:	When	 a	 publicly	 owned	 enterprise	 asks	 for	 a	 loan,	 based	 on	 the	
sources	there	are	2	kinds	of	debts,	which	are	budget	debt	and	market	debt.	When	a	GBE	
makes	a	request	 for	a	debt	 from	the	Commonwealth	Budget	through	the	Department	of	
Finance	and	Administration	that	is	a	budget	debt.	If	the	debt	is	granted	from	the	financial	
market	which	can	be	the	banks,	financial	markets	or	other	financers,	it	is	regarded	as	a	mar-
ket	debt	(Department	of	Finance	and	Administration,	2004).	Due	to	the	explicit	government	
assurance	and	the	conception	of	implicit	government	help,	significant	business	activities	are	
often	granted	the	preferential	treatment.	The	principle	of	debt	neutrality	 is	subject	to	all	
kinds	of	obligations	entailing	government	business	activities	consisting	of	term	loans,	over-
drafts,	commercial	paper	and	bonds,	and	finance	leases	(Department	of	Finance	and	Admin-
istration,	1998).	As	government	business	enterprises	receive	the	favorable	interest	rates	for	
their	debts	due	to	their	status	of	public	ownership,	debt	neutrality	principle	based	on	elimi-
nating	the	difference	between	the	real	interest	rate	and	the	actual	cost	of	debts	significant	
business	 activities	would	 be	 charged	without	 being	 owned	 by	 the	 state.	 Debt	 neutrality	
charges	which	are	applied	for	market	debts	of	significant	business	activities	are	determined	
by	their	shareholder	Minister	(the	shareholder	Minister	of	a	significant	business	activity	is	
identified	by	credit	rating	advice).	To	budget	debts,	no	debt	neutrality	charges	are	imposed	
to	SOEs,	however,	the	interest	rates	are	decided	by	the	Department	of	Finance	and	Admin-
istration	of	Australian	Government	(Deitz,	2012).	
-	Regulatory	neutrality:	As	numerous	regulatory	preference	granted	for	SOEs	have	se-
verely	restrict	the	healthy	competition	in	the	market,	causing	inefficiencies	in	the	economy,	
regulatory	 neutrality	 is	 also	 an	 important	 content	 of	 Australia’s	 competitive	 neutrality	
framework	(Williams,	2013).	The	term	of	regulatory	neutrality	means	that	all	business	enti-
ties	are	equal	in	the	sense	of	regulatory	legal	framework.	The	regulatory	advantages	can	be	
identified	as	the	exemptions	which	free	a	business	entity	from	the	obligations	to	make	a	
payment	or	to	carry	out	certain	activities	(Department	of	Finance	and	Administration,	2004).	
In	the	situation	that	it	is	impossible	to	put	all	market	participants	under	the	same	legal	en-
vironment,	regulatory	adjustments	could	be	implemented	to	neutralize	the	present	regula-
tory	advantages.	There	are	2	methods	of	regulatory	neutrality	for	Australian	Government	to	
choose	the	most	appropriate	one	under	their	particular	circumstance.	The	first	option	is	to	
amend	the	regulatory	framework	so	that	all	business	entities	are	subject	to	the	same	set	of	
policy	and	principles.	The	second	method	is	that	the	government	imposes	a	charge	to	main-
tain	regulatory	neutrality	based	on	case-by-case	calculations	(Deitz,	2012).	In	detail,	there	
are	3	regulatory	neutralizing	adjustments	which	can	be	imposed	to	charge	significant	busi-
ness	activities	(OECD,	2012):		
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(i)	Taking	the	actual	regulatory	payment	or	complying	with	the	actual	regulatory	obli-
gation;	
(ii)	Accepting	an	equivalent	payment	to	the	Official	Public	Account;	
(iii)	Intentionally	adding	the	regulatory	payments	to	the	business	activity’s	cost	base,	
and	hence	price	by	a	relevant	amount	to	the	regulatory	advantages	they	enjoy	due	to	their	
favorable	position.		
-	Commercial	rate	of	return	requirements:	in	terms	of	rate	of	return	requirements,	com-
petitive	neutrality	is	achieved	when	government-owned	businesses	are	required	to	gain	a	
commercial	rate	of	return	 in	a	reasonable	duration	of	time.	 In	other	words,	they	have	to	
compete	with	their	competitors	in	a	level	playing	field	to	make	a	sufficient	rate	of	return.	
The	rate	of	 return	 is	 required	to	at	 least	cover	 the	costs	on	the	assets	 they	use	 for	 their	
business	 activities	 and	 the	 dividends	 to	 Australia’s	 national	 budget	 (O'Fairche-
allaigh/Wanna/Weller,	1999).	The	required	rate	of	return	is	decided	by	Minister	for	Finance	
and	Administration	and	the	responsible	portfolio	Minister	with	the	consultation	from	The	
Treasurer	of	Australia	using	one	among	3	 following	methods.	The	 first	way	 is	 “Weighted	
Average	Cost	of	Capital”	which	finds	out	a	business’s	cost	of	capital	and	sets	it	as	the	lowest	
amount	the	business	has	to	gain.	When	it	is	impossible	to	carry	out	the	first	method,	the	
Minister	for	Finance	and	Administration	can	consider	the	“Risk	broad-banding”	method	–	
determining	the	reasonable	rate	of	return	based	on	evaluating	a	business’s	level	of	market	
risk.	In	the	third	way,	the	most	appropriate	rate	of	return	is	determined	on	the	set	level	of	
return	upon	the	assets	provided	by	the	business	unit.		
b)	The	competitive	neutrality	complaints	mechanism	of	Australia		
Taking	the	issue	of	competitive	neutrality	into	serious	consideration,	the	Australia	Gov-
ernments	 have	 established	 an	 official	 mechanism	 for	 competitive	 neutrality	 complaints.	
When	competitors	of	government	enterprises	in	the	market	identify	the	negative	effects	to	
the	fair	competition	from	significant	business	activities,	these	entities	can	make	complaints	
to	the	Australian	Government	Competitive	Neutrality	Complaints	Office	(the	AGCNCO)	or	
the	Competitive	Neutrality	Complaints	Unit.	Agencies	and	local	governments	can	get	con-
sultation	from	the	AGCNCO	–	an	autonomous	unit	of	the	Productivity	Commission	or	the	
Complaints	Unit	located	in	the	Department	of	Treasury	and	Finance,	if	they	require	assis-
tance	in	this	regard	(Little,	2000).	The	AGCNCO	as	well	as	the	Complaints	Unit,	which	is	both	
called	the	Complaints	Unit	in	general,	is	required	to	deal	with	all	complaints	in	an	unbiased	
independent	careful	manner	and	provide	the	fairest	answer	based	on	the	available	infor-
mation.	
In	the	very	first	stage,	the	Complaints	Unit	will	play	the	role	as	an	arbitrator	discussing	
with	the	affected	enterprise	and	directly	approaching	the	complained	government	business	
for	a	solution.	If	the	two	parties	cannot	come	to	a	solution,	the	complaint	will	then	be	put	in	
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writing	which	clearly	states	the	breach	of	competitive	neutrality	policy	of	the	SOE.	After	the	
complaint	has	been	lodged,	the	Complaints	Unit	will	ask	the	government	business	enterprise	
for	confirmation	of	the	mentioned	violation	of	competitive	neutrality.	When	it	is	necessary,	
an	official	investigation	will	be	carried	out	by	the	Complaints	Unit	with	notifications	being	
sent	to	both	relating	parties.	After	the	conclusion	has	been	reached,	if	either	party	is	not	
satisfied	with	the	result,	they	can	send	request	for	further	investigation	to	the	Complaints	
Unit.	The	Complaints	Unit	will	conduct	further	investigation	if	new	evidence	relating	to	the	
complaint	comes	to	light.	If	any	acts	of	government	businesses	which	are	not	compliant	with	
competitive	neutrality	policy	and	principles	are	found	out,	the	Complaints	Unit	then	inform	
the	relevant	Departmental	Secretary,	or	the	Chief	Executive	Officer	of	the	breach	for	further	
progress	in	the	complaint	(Australian	Government	Competitive	Neutrality	Complaints	Office,	
2014).	
c)	The	effectiveness	of	the	competitive	neutrality	regime	of	Australia		
The	Hilmer	report	in	1993	provided	a	huge	range	of	useful	recommendations	for	the	
introduction	of	competitive	neutrality	in	general	and	the	structural	reforms	of	government	
business	enterprises	in	particular	in	Australia	(Arup	and	Wishart,	2002).	Three	years	later,	
the	competitive	neutrality	regime	was	set	up	as	a	content	of	the	policy	platform	-	Australia’s	
National	Competition	Policy	(Merrett,	2014).	After	about	30	years	of	implementation,	de-
spite	some	remarkable	achievements,	Australia’s	legal	framework	for	competitive	neutrality	
still	continuously	improve	its	effectiveness	and	keep	in	line	with	the	changes	in	the	economy.	
Suggestions	 to	amend	competitive	neutrality	policy	and	revise	 regulatory	 restrictions	are	
constantly	given	out	and	considered	by	Australian	policy	makers,	consisting	of	benchmarks,	
occupational	licensing,	and	planning	and	zoning	rules	that	can	enable	small	business	to	com-
pete	more	effectively	(Harper,	Anderson,	Mccluskey	and	O’Bryan	QC,	2015).	With	continu-
ous	efforts	of	the	government,	among	all	nations	in	the	world,	the	competitive	neutrality	of	
Australia	is	regarded	as	one	of	the	most	advanced	policies	with	long-time	adoption	and	con-
siderable	achievements.	A	number	of	 international	organizations	such	as	OECD,	UNCTAD	
have	recently	stated	the	success	of	Australia	in	establishing	a	level	playing	field	through	an	
effective	legal	system	being	implemented	with	detailed	guidelines	and	complaint-handling	
mechanism	(Harper,	Anderson,	Mccluskey	and	O’Bryan	QcC,	2015).	
The	approach	of	Australia	to	the	issue	of	competitive	neutrality	is	viewed	as	a	success-
ful	model	as	it	has	gained	remarkable	success	in	three	different	aspects	(Pearson,	2014):		
(1)	Australia’s	competitive	neutrality	framework	has	deepened	the	reform	of	govern-
ment	enterprises	sector	in	Australia		
Reforming	the	public	business	enterprises	is	one	of	the	top	priorities	through	all	three	
phases	of	the	microeconomic	reform	process	of	Australia	(Quiggin,	2002).	In	the	1990s,	the	
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efficiency	of	Australian	government	business	enterprises	is	low	in	comparison	with	the	pri-
vate	sectors	in	the	relevant	market	and	even	equivalent	SOEs	in	other	countries	(Arup	and	
Wishart,	 2002).	 The	 reform	 of	 Australia	 public	 sector	 is	 carried	 out	 aiming	 at	 improving	
productivity	of	this	sector	with	competitive	neutrality	is	one	of	the	underlying	principles.	The	
competitive	neutrality	policy	 requires	government	business	enterprises	 to	compete	 in	an	
equal	footing	with	their	present	or	potential	competitors	in	the	market	by	neutralizing	the	
unfair	advantages	that	they	are	enjoying.	Competitive	neutrality	framework	has	greatly	con-
tributed	to	the	gains	of	the	microeconomic	reform	in	Australia.	Since	1990s,	with	growing	
attention	given	to	SOEs,	the	information	on	their	performance	has	been	increasingly	availa-
ble	and	better	recorded.	The	reform	of	public	sector	has	resulted	in	enhanced	operational	
efficiency,	comparable	prices,	beneficial	influences	on	the	financial	budget	status	of	Austral-
ian	Governments	as	well	as	the	broad	economic	background	of	Australia.	Hence,	not	only	
government	business	enterprises	improve	their	competitiveness	and	restructure	their	debt	
levels	but	Australian	Governments	also	benefit	from	a	healthier	competition	environment	
and	reduced	budgetary	deficits.	Essentially,	these	achievements	did	not	occur	with	the	sac-
rifice	in	the	service	levels,	the	levels	of	service	in	Australia	actually	grew	in	both	quantity	and	
quality	at	the	same	time	(Marsden	and	Associates,	1998).	
	(2)	All	economic	entities	have	to	comply	with	competitive	neutrality	framework	in-
cluding	major	government	businesses	which	resulted	in	considerable	efficiency	gains.		
The	reform	of	government	business	enterprises	was	mostly	implemented	based	on	pri-
vatization	and	corporatization	with	the	amendments	in	the	regulatory	legal	framework	as	
well.	 As	 being	 carried	 out	 by	major	 public	 businesses	which	 occupied	 significant	market	
share,	this	reform	has	had	great	impacts	on	the	national	economy.	Firstly,	major	SOEs	could	
no	longer	take	advantage	of	their	market	power	in	its	favor	as	a	huge	number	of	structural	
reforms	were	carried	out	with	the	aim	to	eliminate	the	abuse	of	market	position	and	create	
a	fair	competition	environment.	The	structural	reforms	in	publicly	owned	enterprises	in	ma-
jor	industries	including	electricity,	gas,	water	utilities	and	telecommunications	are	prime	ex-
amples	of	this	point	(Marsden	and	Associates,	1998).	Secondly,	in	compliance	with	the	com-
petitive	neutrality	regime,	government	business	enterprises	had	to	compete	in	a	compara-
ble	manner	with	other	market	participants,	giving	customers	more	choices	at	reasonable	
prices.	For	instance,	after	reform	of	public	enterprises	in	the	electricity	industry,	the	price	
that	final	consumers	had	to	pay	actually	reduced	in	real	terms	(OECD,	2008).	Last	but	not	
least,	the	most	important	achievement	of	this	reform	is	the	increasing	productivity	of	gov-
ernment	business	enterprises	resulting	in	higher	levels	of	service,	quality	and	safety.	In	ad-
dition,	Australian’s	SOEs,	in	general,	also	became	more	productive	in	compared	with	SOEs	
in	other	developed	countries	in	the	world.	For	example,	the	electricity	service	of	Australia	
has	become	more	reliable	with	greater	stability	and	advanced	technology.		
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(3)	 Australia’s	 competitive	 neutrality	 framework	 has	 substantially	 eliminated	 the	
preferences	of	publicly	owned	sector	
As	one	of	the	key	contents	of	Australia’s	National	Competition	Policy	reform,	the	com-
petitive	neutrality	policy	was	adopted	with	the	underlying	principle	of	neutralizing	all	the	
advantages	 that	 government	business	 enterprises	 enjoyed	 solely	 due	 to	 their	 ownership	
(Kinnear,	Charters	and	Vitartas,	2012).		The	attempts	to	eliminate	all	the	advantages	granted	
to	publicly	owned	enterprises	are	illustrated	through	the	set	of	4	competitive	neutrality	prin-
ciples:	regulatory	neutrality,	debt	neutrality,	tax	neutrality	and	rate	of	return.	All	the	unfair	
preference	biased	commercial	interests	in	SOEs’	favors	are	replaced,	simplified	or	charged.	
In	addition,	structural	reforms	were	accelerated	to	limit	the	number	of	government	business	
enterprises	with	excessive	market	power	while	the	operation	of	existing	SOEs	is	better	con-
trolled	(Cooper,	Funnell	and	Lee,	2012).	The	control	of	governmental	sector	was	tightened	
with	a	number	of	preferential	regulatory	provisions	were	amended.	Operational	efficiencies	
as	well	as	the	productivity	of	government	business	enterprises	were	boosted	to	meet	the	
required	rate	of	return	enhancing	their	competitiveness.	Australian	governments	benefited	
from	increasing	tax	paid	and	reduced	subsidies	as	advantages	in	terms	of	tax	and	debt	for	
government-owned	enterprises	were	eliminated	(OECD,	2008).		
2.	Competitive	neutrality	in	China	
a)	Principles	of	competitive	neutrality	policy	in	China	
The	first	principle	that	Chinese	Government	strictly	follows	in	the	conduct	of	competi-
tive	neutrality	is	neutralizing	on	commercial	opportunities	for	all	kinds	of	business	entities.	
To	be	more	specific,	one	of	the	most	fundamental	implications	of	competitive	neutrality	is	
that	Chinese	Government	must	ensure	all	commercial	entities	are	offered	equal	trading	op-
portunities	on	having	access	to	resource	allocation.	Acting	as	a	precursor	element	to	the	
establish	of	competitive	environment,	it	is	required	that	neutrality	must	be	maintained	on	
trading	opportunities.	Neutrality	on	trading	opportunities	among	all	kinds	of	businesses	in	
China	 is	most	 practiced	 in	 2	 areas:	market	 entry	 and	 government	 purchase	 (Maozhong,	
2015).	Maintaining	competitive	neutrality	in	terms	of	market	entry	requires	that	the	govern-
ment	put	all	economic	sectors	before	the	same	barriers	of	market	entry.	It	means	that	they	
all	encounter	the	same	set	of	regulations	on	business	license,	expansion	of	business	opera-
tion	and	conclusion	of	commercial	contracts,	so	that	companies	can	only	break	into	the	tar-
get	market	by	 its	 internal	 capacity.	Competitive	neutrality	 implementation	 from	the	per-
spective	of	government	purchase	implies	that	equal	opportunities	are	created	for	all	market	
participants	regardless	of	their	ownership	status.	In	details,	the	procedure	on	the	identity	of	
participants,	form	of	participation,	information	disclosure	and	evaluation	mechanisms	must	
be	clearly	and	systematically	enacted	without	any	unreasonable	exceptions	for	any	enter-
prises.	
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The	second	competitive	neutrality	principle	applied	in	the	context	of	Chinese	economy	
is	to	neutralize	all	operating	burdens	(Maozhong,	2015).	Basically,	it	represents	the	demand	
of	neutrality	on	the	operating	burdens	of	participants	in	allocation	of	market	resources	rang-
ing	from	compulsory	burdens	unilaterally	imposed	by	the	government,	e.g.	taxes,	regulation,	
social	responsibility,	to	negotiable	burdens	such	as	loans	and	financing,	default	liabilities	and	
tort	liabilities.	It	is	apparent	the	operating	burdens	that	directly	or	indirectly	emerging	from	
trading	opportunities	will	be	added	into	the	operating	costs.	Notwithstanding,	the	increases	
in	the	operating	costs	can	surely	act	as	hinder	to	successful	business	performance	of	the	
company.	Hence,	to	set	up	a	level	playing	field	where	all	enterprises	competing	in	an	equal	
footing	over	 their	 competitors,	 competitive	neutrality	 is	 required	 to	balance	 compulsory	
burdens	and	reduce	of	negotiable	burdens.	
The	third	principle	in	the	conduct	of	competitive	neutrality	of	Chinese	Government	is	
neutrality	in	terms	of	investment	return	(Maozhong,	2015).	Chinese	Government	must	levy	
fair	investment	returns	on	the	use	of	market	resources	for	relevant	market	participants.	One	
of	the	criteria	for	the	effectiveness	of	companies	in	winning	trading	opportunities	over	their	
competitors	or	lessening	operating	burdens	is	the	return	on	investment.	Although	the	in-
vestment	return,	in	many	cases,	is	heavily	influenced	by	internal	factors	such	as	the	com-
pany’s	ability	to	foster	innovations,	the	company’s	financial	situation,	etc.	external	factors	
in	which	government	interference	cannot	be	taken	lightly.	Chinese	Government’s	efforts	in	
neutralizing	investment	returns	can	be	seen	in	2	areas,	which	are	price	regulation	and	gov-
ernment	subsidy.	Competitive	neutrality	reflected	in	price	regulations	is	that,	to	some	ex-
tent,	the	government	takes	control	of	the	market	price	preventing	companies	from	“selling	
commodities	at	unfairly	high	prices	or	buying	commodities	at	unfairly	low	prices”	(Anti-mo-
nopoly	Law	of	China, Art.	17	(1))	so	that	all	participants	are	in	the	same	situation	to	gain	
revenue.	 Similarly,	neutrality	 in	government	 subsidy	 requests	 the	government	 to	equally	
grant	the	subsidy	supported	by	public	funds,	so	that	all	companies	have	equal	access	to	gov-
ernment	subsidy.	
b)	Complaint	and	supervision	system	
Different	from	Australia,	an	official	legal	framework	for	competitive	neutrality	has	not	
been	created	in	China	yet.	The	orientations	from	Chinese	Government	in	the	direction	of	
competitive	neutrality	is	demonstrated	through	a	series	of	measures	to	reform	and	super-
vise	SOEs.	Therefore,	it	is	understandable	that	until	now,	Chinese	has	not	had	a	complaint	
and	 supervision	 system	 for	 competitive	 neutrality	 yet.	 The	 complaints	with	 reference	 to	
competitive	neutrality,	however,	can	still	be	handled	in	an	official	manner	by	written	pro-
posals	 to	deputies	of	 the	People’s	Congress,	 to	political	advisors	of	 the	People’s	Political	
Consultative	Congress,	or	officials	in	some	democratic	parties.		
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The	most	noticeable	legislative	efforts	of	Chinese	Government	on	competitive	neutral-
ity	are	seen	in	2004	through	two	bills,	proposals	to	eliminate	systemic	of	economic	develop-
ment	and	foster	friendly	environment	for	Non-state-owned	economy	(No.	0190)	and	Pro-
posals	to	encourage	and	support	private	enterprises	to	help	reorganize	and	update	SOEs	
(No.	2349),	which	were	proposed	by	Revolutionary	Committee	of	the	Chinese	Kuomintang	
and	the	All-China	Federation	of	Industry	and	Commercial,	respectively	(Wendy,	2016).	The	
prime	goal	of	these	bills	is	to	set	up	the	fairness	between	SOEs	and	non-	SOEs	from	the	legal	
perspective,	removing	heavy	market	entry	barriers	for	other	sectors	in	many	industries,	neu-
tralizing	all	investment	and	financial	advantages	of	the	government	owned	sector,	unifying	
the	taxation	system	for	all	commercial	entities,	reviewing	and	making	adjustments	on	the	
policies	that	constitute	discrimination	to	the	private	sector,	encouraging	the	changes	in	gov-
ernment	 functions	and	the	reform	of	administrative	system.	These	contents	are	stressed	
again	on	“Some	opinions	on	supporting	and	guiding	the	development	of	non-state-owned	
Economy”	issued	by	the	State	Council	in	2005.	
More	recently,	Chinese	took	one	more	step	closer	to	the	procedure	of	drafting	related	
competition	policies	with	competitive	neutrality	content	is	 included	as	stated	in	the	Anti-
monopoly	Law	of	China, Art.	9.	Therefore,	as	long	as	the	Anti-monopoly	Commission	is	given	
the	power	to	act	as	a	complaints	and	supervision	system	as	part	of	a	competitive	neutrality	
framework,	it	will	strengthen	the	relationships	between	competition	enforcement	authori-
ties	and	regulation	maker	authorities	so	that	all	unfair	favors	granted	to	the	public	sector	
will	be	removed.			
c)	General	approach	to	the	competitive	neutrality	policy		
-	Administrative	enforcement:	Chinese	Government	manages	the	implementation	of	
competitive	neutrality	by	ensuring	that	all	enterprises	follow	the	non-discrimination	princi-
ple	and	standards	established	through	the	administrative	process.	In	the	present	economic	
context	of	China,	government	interference	in	the	market	is	considered	necessary	in	the	case	
of	market	failure,	therefore,	with	one	of	the	implications	of	competitive	neutrality	is	govern-
mental	intervention	at	a	reasonable	level.	Competitive	neutrality	in	China,	therefore	indi-
cates	a	fair	competitive	environment	through	the	compliance	of	all	business	entities	with	
competitive	neutrality	policies	which	are	administratively	regulated	under	proper	enforce-
ment	from	Chinese	Government.	The	Report	on	the	Business	Development	Environment	in	
China	2013	demonstrates	the	changes	in	Chinese	government’s	awareness	that	the	practice	
of	their	power	in	the	market	should	be	put	after	the	establishment	of	competitive	neutrality	
in	the	national	economy.	Hence,	more	efforts	are	required	to	amend	competitive	neutrality	
legal	framework	while	powering	its	competition	enforcement	agencies	to	control	adminis-
trative	monopoly	and	more	methods	to	combat	it.	
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-	Institutional	reform:	The	launch	of	a	timely	institutional	reform	is	also	one	of	the	most	
vital	background	for	competitive	neutrality	establishment.	Institutional	reform	has	signifi-
cant	impacts	on	the	implementation	of	competitive	neutrality	as	in	China,	a	number	of	unfair	
favors	granted	to	SOEs	have	far	exceed	the	scope	of	competition	law.	Following	competitive	
neutrality	policy	and	principles,	the	institutional	reform	has	to	(i)	break	down	the	unfair	mar-
ket	entry	barriers	created	by	governmental	intervention	in	the	marketplace	and	exclude	all	
the	restraints	caused	by	these	barriers	(ii)	and	set	up	non-discrimination	treatment	in	the	
market	by	the	institutional	system	and	reorganize	it	accordingly.	
-	Competition	advocacy:	Actions	conducted	by	the	competition	authorities	to	improve	
the	 competition	environment	are	 important	 to	promoting	and	providing	 supplements	 to	
anti-monopoly	enforcement,	pushing	forward	effective	implementation	of	competition	pol-
icy	and	facilitating	competition	awareness	building	(Maozhong,	2015).	As	competitive	neu-
trality	 has	 not	 been	widely	 aware	 among	 all	 enterprises	 over	China,	 pertinent	measures	
should	be	carried	out	as	increasing	the	general	awareness	(competition	law)	building,	com-
pliance	guidance	and	theoretical	studies	in	the	direction	of	fair	competition	to	relevant	au-
thorities.	Therefore,	to	establish	competitive	neutrality	in	the	national	economy,	the	com-
petition	authorities	in	China,	including	the	National	Development	and	Reform	Commission,	
the	Ministry	of	Commerce,	the	Sate	Administration	for	Industry	and	commerce	and	the	pro-
vincial	agencies	authorize	by	them	should,	in	addition	to	law	enforcement,	work	together	
with	the	Anti-Monopoly	Committee	of	 the	State	Council	 to	enrich	their	understanding	of	
competitive	neutrality	issue	and	their	readiness	to	open	competition.	
d)	History	of	SOEs	reform	in	China	
1978	-	1986:	The	power	of	SOEs	was	decentralized	and	their	earned	profits	are	allowed	
to	share.	The	SOEs	reform	of	China	in	this	period	consisted	of	the	expansion	of	government-
owned	companies	in	terms	of	operational	autonomy,	the	profits	from	their	business	activi-
ties	were	shared	partly	 for	 the	government	 through	 tax	payment	and	 leasing	 systems	of	
managerial	responsibility.	
1986	-	1992:	Chinese	Government	moved	their	SOEs	further	from	the	protection	of	the	
state	by	separating	ownership	and	management.	In	this	stage,	China	has	built	up	the	con-
tract	system	of	managerial	responsibility	which	clearly	stated	that	the	division	of	responsi-
bility,	management	rights,	and	profits	between	the	owner	of	the	enterprise	and	relevant	
government	authority	is	all	agreed	in	a	signed	written	contract.	Another	noticeable	action	
towards	competitive	neutrality	in	this	period	of	China	is	the	enactment	of	the	Law	on	indus-
trial	enterprises.	The	Law	was	adopted	in	April	1988	and	took	into	effect	in	August	1988	with	
the	main	objective	of	 laying	the	background	for	separation	of	ownership	and	managerial	
authority.	Also,	the	system	of	the	state-owned	assets	operation	obligation	was	put	into	prac-
tice.	This	system	did	not	only	stimulate	the	diversification	of	ownership	forms	but	it	was	also	
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the	driving	force	for	SOEs	to	act	as	real	producers	and	managers	in	the	market	rather	than	
administrative	implementing	tools	of	the	government.	Nonetheless,	government	interven-
tion	in	the	market	could	still	be	seen	through	the	enactment	of	the	General	Principles	of	the	
Civil	Laws	in	which	Chinese	Government	still	gave	favorable	treatments	to	its	owned	com-
panies	via	the	property	rights.	
1992	–	2002:	This	period	is	characterized	by	corporate	restructuring	process	of	SOEs	in	
China	leading	to	the	establishment	of	a	generation	of	modern	enterprises	with	clear	sepa-
ration	of	power	and	rights,	operation	rights	coming	from	other	sources	rather	than	the	re-
lations	with	the	authority,	management	acts	in	response	to	changes	in	the	market.	While	
the	performance	and	situation	of	each	SOE	in	China	vary	from	one	to	another,	the	govern-
ment	 launched	the	strategic	restructure	program	in	the	direction	of	the	thrive	of	success	
large	enterprises	while	invigorating	the	small	ones.		
2003	–	2011:	In	order	to	make	sure	that	the	public	capital	will	be	put	into	good	use,	
the	State-owned	Assets	Supervision	and	Administration	Commission	was	set	up	 in	March	
2003	to	consider	and	distribute	the	capital	funds	on	behalf	of	Chinese	Government,	author-
ized	by	the	State	Council.	A	new	trend	started	from	this	period	is	the	system	of	the	board	of	
directors	who	are	empower	to	recruit	or	fire	managers	of	the	company	in	favor	of	its	com-
mercial	interests.	Legal	actions	taken	in	this	period	include	the	amendment	of	Company	Law	
to	accelerate	 the	 reform	process	 in	 the	national	economy.	Another	 thing	 that	cannot	be	
forgotten	is	the	securitization	transform	of	state-owned	assets	with	the	major	aim	of	sepa-
rating	and	reorganizing	the	benefits	and	risks	of	state-owned	assets.	
The	latest	achievements	on	the	reform	of	China:	With	international	pressure	and	do-
mestic	demands	for	competitive	neutrality,	China	has	continuously	taken	actions	to	address	
this	issue.	For	the	first	time,	competitive	neutrality	is	highlighted	in	the	report	on	the	Eight-
eenth	National	Congress	of	the	Communist	Party	of	China	–	the	official	introduction	in	such	
an	important	written	document.	Competitive	neutrality	has	remained	as	one	of	the	corner-
stones	 in	 the	 reform	of	 SOEs	 as	 the	 “Opinions	on	 further	 deepening	 the	 Shanghai	 state-
owned	assets	to	promote	the	development	of	state-owned	enterprises”	has	formally	put	an	
emphasis	on	that.	For	example,	SOEs	in	coal	power	of	China	play	an	essential	role	 in	this	
industry	holding	the	majority	of	assets	and	financial	accesses,	 therefore	Chinese	Govern-
ment	 has	 come	 to	 decision	 of	 slowing	 down	 the	 growth	 of	 this	 economic	 sector	 (Mor-
gan/Xueying/David/Uday,	2015).	Apparently,	with	international	pressure	and	domestic	de-
mands	for	competitive	neutrality,	China	has	actively	taken	actions	to	address	this	issue.	
	
		
    
36 
V.	CHALLENGES	OF	THE	APPLICATION	OF	COMPETITIVE	NEUTRALITY	IN	VIETNAM		
1.	Overview	of	the	competition	status	in	Vietnam		
In	comparison	with	 the	surrounding	nations,	Vietnam	history	has	 longer	war	period	
and	as	a	result,	Vietnam’s	economy	also	suffered	from	“three	lost	decades”	when	the	whole	
country	risked	everything	to	earn	the	independence	back.	Forty	years	have	passed	since	the	
last	day	of	war	in	Vietnam,	and	the	national	economy	is	growing	at	a	dramatic	speed.	Despite	
a	hiccup	following	the	1997	Asian	economic	crisis,	the	history	of	Vietnamese	economy	has	
turned	to	a	new	page	when	the	Government	decided	to	change	the	direction	of	the	whole	
national	economy	from	the	centrally	planned	economy	in	the	late	1980s	into	a	market	econ-
omy	under	its	'Doi	Moi'	(renovation)	policy.	The	effectiveness	of	the	new	market	orientation	
is	reflected	in	the	continuous	growth	at	a	rapid	pace	of	the	economy,	marking	Vietnam	as	
one	of	the	countries	with	the	fastest-growing	economies	in	Southeast	Asian.		
Being	a	fast-growing	economy	with	outstanding	economic	growth	rates,	Vietnam	has	
become	a	promising	market	as	well	as	an	attractive	investment	destination	with	great	po-
tential	for	sustainable	development	in	the	future.	On	the	other	hand,	it	should	also	be	noted	
that	quick	economic	growth	also	comes	with	increasing	demands	for	a	perfect	market	mech-
anism,	 or	 a	 fair	 competitive	 environment	 for	 all	 business	 entities	 to	 compete	with	 each	
other,	which	Vietnamese	authority	is	still	struggling	to	achieve.	The	pressure	for	an	effective	
competitive	 legal	 framework	also	comes	from	the	world.	Thanks	to	advanced	technology	
and	globalization	trend,	all	economies	in	the	world	have	been	brought	closer	in	a	same	arena	
called	the	global	economy	where	all	economies	compete	in	a	fair	manner.	The	global	econ-
omy	has	opened	the	opportunities	for	enterprises	to	move	across	borders	and	establish	their	
business	activities	at	any	corner	in	the	world.	Moreover,	rapid	economic	growth	experienced	
by	an	economy	that	has	a	low	starting	point	has	led	to	the	existence	of	a	number	of	sectors	
or	areas	characterized	by	state	monopoly.	These	trends	require	countries	to	complete	the	
legal	regulations	of	their	national	economy	making	sure	that	their	economy	is	a	level	playing	
field	for	all	commercial	entities.	This	notion	is	strongly	put	forward	by	international	organi-
zations	that	Vietnam	attends	as	an	official	member.	The	changing	awareness	of	the	Govern-
ment	in	favor	of	a	market	economy	which	has	been	implemented	through	“Doi	Moi”	shows	
strong	commitment	of	Vietnam	to	the	establishment	of	a	healthy	competitive	environment	
for	all	market	participants.	In	order	to	achieve	that,	competition	law	has	been	drafted	and	
then	officially	taken	into	effect	in	2005	laying	the	foundation	for	an	effective	enforcement	
of	fair	competition	in	the	real	market.	
Becoming	an	official	member	of	ASEAN	in	1995	marked	the	very	first	steps	of	Vietnam	
in	the	integration	process	further	into	the	world	economy	following	by	commitment	of	Vi-
etnam	with	international	trade	organizations	such	as	WTO	or	other	(new	generation	FTAs).	
The	pressure	from	the	global	economy,	along	with	the	demand	from	the	domestic	economy	
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for	competitiveness	enhancement	has	pushed	Vietnam	to	make	efforts	on	building	an	effec-
tive	 legal	 regime,	effectively	 implement	competition	policies,	and	set	up	an	 independent	
competition	authority	to	ensure	a	fair	competitive	environment	for	both	domestic	and	for-
eign	companies	operating	in	Vietnam.	At	that	time,	before	the	introduction	of	Competition	
Law,	anticompetitive	practices	and	monopolies	in	particular	markets	are	ruled	by	the	sepa-
rate	provisions	in	a	number	of	legislations	the	Ordinance	on	Price,	the	Ordinance	on	Tele-
communications,	the	Law	on	Credit	Institutions,	Commercial	Law,	Electricity	Law,	etc.	Under	
that	circumstance,	in	2000	the	National	Assembly	and	the	Government	came	to	the	decision	
of	putting	the	Competition	Law	into	a	legislative	program.	Vietnam	Competition	Law	was	
approved	by	the	National	Assembly	on	November	9,	2004,	and	took	into	effect	on	July	1,	
2005.	The	Law	was	a	result	of	a	four-year	process	that	saw	various	drafts	circulated	for	com-
ments	from	both	domestic	and	international	experts.	Reviewing	competition	legal	frame-
works	of	more	than	30	nations	and	receiving	supports	from	international	organizations,	Vi-
etnam’s	Law	on	Competition	obtains	elements	of	model	laws	and	international	guidelines,	
however,	it	still	carries	significant	divergences	due	to	the	socialist-oriented	direction	of	the	
national	economy	(Williams,	2013).		
Over	the	past	few	years,	Vietnam	has	experienced	intense	competition	activities	in	the	
national	economy	of	Vietnam	leaving	distinguishing	marks	in	the	competition	situation	of	
Vietnam.	After	a	 lot	of	stop-and-go	efforts,	starting	from	easy	and	small	SOEs	continuing	
with	large	and	difficult	ones,	the	privatization	of	government	owned	enterprises	in	Vietnam	
has	gained	remarkable	results.	With	the	government-owned	sector,	2015	marks	the	final	
year	of	the	Scheme	on	restructuring	SOEs	with	the	focus	on	Economic	Groups	and	State-
owned	Corporations	in	the	period	of	2011-2015.	During	the	first	four-year	period,	being	im-
plemented	in	a	concentrated	manner,	re-arranging	the	government	owned	sector	plan	of	
Vietnam	has	gained	considerable	achievements	with	the	equalization	of	242	SOEs,	the	ac-
quisition	of	6	enterprises,	the	merge	and	consolidation	of	32	enterprises.	The	restructuring	
process	of	SOEs	in	2014	–	2015	has	been	planned	continuing	with	approximately	479	other	
enterprises	in	which	432	enterprises	are	about	to	be	equitized;	22	ones	are	subjected	to	be	
acquired,	dissolved,	bankrupted;	25	ones	are	expected	to	be	merged	or	consolidated	(VCA,	
2015).	While	the	public	sector	is	being	reduced	in	both	number	and	economic	size,	other	
part	of	the	economy	is	taking	their	place	in	the	marketplace.	With	the	protection	from	Com-
petition	 Law	 2004	 and	 the	 incentives	 given	 by	 the	 Government,	 spectacular	 economic	
growth	is	seen	in	the	private	sector	as	their	operational	efficiency	is	much	higher	than	the	
public	one.	While	the	role	of	private	business	entities	in	the	economy	is	increasing,	foreigner	
companies	have	also	boomed	and	expanded	their	activities	in	Vietnamese	market.	While	the	
whole	economy	is	moving	too	fast	with	a	wide	range	of	business	entities	involved,	the	de-
mand	for	a	level	playing	field	for	all	market	participants,	potential	and	present,	has	attracted	
much	attention	than	ever.	
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2.	The	needs	for	the	application	of	principles	of	competitive	neutrality	in	Vietnam	
There	are	four	underlying	reasons	for	the	establishment	of	SOEs	in	the	first	place.	In	
order	 to	gain	a	strong	position	 in	 the	 international	arena,	every	economy	has	 to	possess	
powerful	enterprises	in	their	major	fields	and	that	is	where	the	first	reason	coming	from.	
However,	the	process	of	setting	up	an	outstanding	business	entity	to	compete	with	other	
competitors	from	different	countries	would	be	time-consuming,	therefore	setting	up	SOEs	
acting	as	a	shortcut	that	is	totally	worth	considering.	The	second	reason	is	rooted	from	the	
low	or	non-profitability	in	the	provision	of	(often	capital-intensive)	public	utilities	and	infra-
structures	which	was	 the	 common	 situation	 in	many	 countries	 in	 the	world	 in	 the	 past	
(Yuen/Freeman/Huynh,	1996).	The	third	reason	for	the	setting	up	of	a	number	of	SOEs	not	
only	in	Vietnam	but	in	a	number	of	countries	in	the	world	comes	from	the	need	to	raise	up	
the	development	of	remote	and	mountainous	areas.	Last	but	not	least,	the	establishment	of	
government-owned	entities	also	reflects	the	demand	of	necessary	industries	for	Vietnam’s	
industrialization	and	modernization,	which	the	private	sector,	at	that	time,	due	to	a	number	
of	reasons	in	terms	of	financial	situation	and	economic	scale,	cannot	play	the	role	of	pro-
moting.	With	special	ownership	status	being	of	the	government,	Vietnam’s	SOEs	are	granted	
preferential	access	to	land,	capital	and	public	procurement	opportunities,	they	were	able	to	
use	their	political	relations	to	navigate	Vietnam’s	complex	regulatory	environment	to	gain	
competitive	advantages.	However,	the	prosperity	of	the	public	sector	also	goes	with	increas-
ing	disadvantages	for	the	development	of	small	and	medium	enterprises.	
3.	Challenges	for	Vietnam	in	introducing	Competitive	Neutrality	
a)	Common	challenges	for	developing	country	
-	Slow,	imperfect	market	structures	
The	principle	orientation	of	the	national	economy	is	inevitably	influenced	by	the	polit-
ical	directions,	long-time	history	and	time-honored	culture	of	each	nation.	In	the	context	of	
the	developing	world,	normally,	these	countries	underwent	long	war	time	experiencing	var-
ious	historical	changes	in	their	political	system	creating	very	unique	features	for	their	na-
tional	economies.	Embracing	the	globalization	trend,	developing	countries	have	taken	up	
the	chance	to	gradually	 integrate	 into	the	world	economies,	taking	a	closer	 look	 into	the	
market	structure	of	developed	ones,	and	that	is	when	the	characteristics	of	their	economies	
as	slow	and	imperfect	are	revealed	(Louise/Judd/Amy,	2011).	
From	a	competitive	perspective,	a	slow	and	imperfect	market	structure	refers	to	the	
imperfection	of	the	competitive	environment	which	takes	a	very	long	time	to	modify	in	the	
slow	movement	of	the	national	economy.	One	of	the	most	identifying	features	of	the	imper-
fect	competition	in	the	national	economy	of	developing	countries	is	the	existence	of	mo-
nopoly	or	oligopoly	positions,	which	are	government-owned	in	most	cases,	in	the	market-
place.	Being	established	from	the	political,	social	and	economic	purposes	of	the	government,	
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SOEs	have	been	the	largest	employers	in	the	economy	making	significant	proportions	into	
the	total	income	of	the	economy	as	a	whole.		
As	a	consequence,	the	open	competition	is	severely	distorted	or	restrained.	Being	the	
only	enterprise	in	the	market	(monopoly	position)	or	at	the	dominant	position	in	the	market	
(oligopoly	position),	public	sector	business	entities	can	totally	take	advantage	of	their	mar-
ket	power	to	harm	the	healthy	competition	(Jacques,	1995).	It	is	the	common	situations	in	
many	developing	countries	that	SOEs	largely	eliminate	the	competition	among	all	market	
participants	in	the	market.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	they	are	in	an	ideal	position	to	that	
as	strong	financial	situation	supported	by	the	official	authority	enables	them	to	take	such	
actions	and	the	protection	of	the	government	is	strong	enough	to	exempt	them	from	legal	
consequences	of	such	violations.	When	the	government	itself	does	not	hold	a	firm	determi-
nation	 towards	a	 level	playing	 field,	 it	 is	 very	hard	 to	 fix	 the	 imperfection	of	 the	market	
mechanism.	In	addition,	the	economy	itself	of	developing	countries	has	already	been	slow	
in	response	to	the	adjustments	of	the	government	while	the	acceptance	of	the	dominance	
of	the	public	sector	in	the	market	has	deeply	rooted	among	all	economic	sectors.	Therefore,	
in	order	to	make	competitive	neutrality	not	just	a	paper	term	but	a	real	practice,	the	slow	
and	imperfect	market	structure	of	developing	countries	is	a	field	that	this	developing	world	
really	needs	to	work	more	on.	
-	Large	networks	of	informal	markets	
From	legal	perspective,	the	informal	markets	refer	to	the	ones	sharing	the	same	fea-
ture	that	is	the	avoidance	of	government	regulations	and	taxes	(Klarita,	1990).	The	reason	
for	the	lack	of	legal	governance	to	this	sector	lies	in	the	fundamental	features	of	this	sector.	
In	the	informal	markets,	while	the	number	of	business	transactions	is	not	small,	the	form	of	
these	business	transactions	is	also	not	a	formal	one	with	written	documents	and	standard-
ized	procedure	to	follow.	Therefore,	it	would	be	very	difficult	to	control	this	informal	sector.	
The	management	process	would	be	 time-consuming,	 costly	while	 its	 effectiveness	 is	 not	
easy	to	be	guaranteed.		
The	sheer	size	of	the	informal	sector	actually	varies	from	country	to	country,	for	exam-
ple,	 it	contributes	about	50%	of	the	total	nation	output,	attracting	more	than	80%	of	the	
total	employment,	and	even	accounting	for	90%	of	newly	created	jobs	in	Africa	low	income	
countries,	nevertheless	it	is	not	the	same	situation	in	Vietnam	(Ahmadou,	2014).	Although	
the	power	of	informal	markets	is	different	in	different	countries,	with	its	longstanding	his-
tory,	this	sector	has	significantly	contributed	to	the	productivity	and	the	development	of	the	
whole	economy.	In	the	context	of	developing	countries,	the	existence	of	large	networks	of	
informal	markets	is	common	and	widely	recognized.		
It	 is	understandable	that	the	operation	of	these	markets	is	considered	as	one	of	the	
main	challenges	to	the	establishment	of	a	level	playing	field	in	the	national	economy.	As	the	
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informal	sector	does	not	operate	under	legal	governance	and	taxation	system	of	the	gov-
ernment,	so	it	is	almost	impossible	to	control	the	competitiveness	in	these	markets.	When	
the	fairness	of	the	competitive	environment	is	not	guaranteed	in	these	markets,	it	obviously	
goes	against	the	principles	of	competitive	neutrality.	A	level	playing	field	indicates	that	all	
market	participants	will	be	treated	in	an	equal	manner	ensuring	that	relations	with	the	state	
do	not	bring	any	favors	or	competitive	advantages	to	any	business	entities.	Therefore,	when	
the	informal	markets	–	a	significant	part	of	the	economy	does	not	follow	competitive	neu-
trality	law	and	policies,	the	establishment	of	competitive	neutrality	in	the	national	economy	
cannot	be	completed.	
-	High	barriers	to	entry	
The	barriers	to	market	entry	can	be	divided	into	3	categories,	which	are	from	financial	
requirements,	legal	regulations	and	existing	competitors	in	the	market	(Allen/Ben,	2007).	In	
terms	of	costs,	a	particular	financial	background	will	be	required	to	meet	before	the	com-
mercial	entities	being	legally	set	up.	Legal	regulations	for	a	new	business	entity	in	a	particular	
market	include	the	pre-registration,	registration,	post-registration	activities.	Also,	the	pro-
cess	of	entering	a	new	market	can	encounter	obstacles	created	by	enterprises	who	are	pres-
ently	operating	in	the	markets.	
In	fact,	even	until	now,	when	the	developing	countries	have	become	more	open	and	
they	even	remove	a	number	of	market	entry	barriers	 to	attract	 foreign	 investments	 into	
their	economy,	more	still	needs	to	be	done.	Administrative	procedure	can	be	an	apparent	
hinder	for	potential	market	participants	as	the	bureaucratic	administrative	system	in	devel-
oping	countries	is	normally	slow	with	time-consuming	and	complicated	requirements.	The	
competitive	pressure	from	competitors	which	are	presently	operating	in	the	target	markets	
is	also	remarkable,	as	the	appearance	of	a	new	enterprise	in	the	marketplace	can	be	real	
threat	to	the	existing	market	participants	so	they	may	take	actions	to	prevent	that	to	happen	
(Theodore,	1998).		
Competitive	neutrality	refers	to	a	fair	competitive	environment	for	all	enterprises	re-
gardless	of	its	ownership,	including	the	ones	that	are	operating	in	the	markets,	and	also	the	
ones	that	potentially	play	in	these	markets.	It	is	obvious	that	when	companies	have	to	cross	
high	barriers	to	break	into	the	target	markets,	they	are	in	disadvantageous	position	to	com-
pete	with	other	enterprises,	which	is	totally	against	the	fundamental	policy	of	competitive	
neutrality.	Therefore,	high	barriers	to	enter	markets	in	developing	countries	implies	another	
difficulty	that	governments	of	such	countries	will	have	to	deal	with	in	the	way	of	setting	up	
a	level	playing	field.		
-	Severe	shortage	of	trained	professionals	to	enforce	the	principles	of	competitive	neu-
trality	
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Since	the	first	time	being	implemented	in	Australia	in	1996,	competitive	neutrality	has	
become	ubiquitous	being	widely	adopted	all	over	the	world	(Lane,	1997).	It	means	that	the	
notion	of	“competitive	neutrality”	has	received	great	concern	in	the	international	arena	for	
about	2	decades,	but	the	situation	is	not	the	same	in	the	developing	world.	In	fact,	compet-
itive	neutrality	has	only	gained	attention	from	policy	makers,	economic	researchers	and	en-
terprises	in	developing	countries	for	about	several	years.	In	other	words,	while	the	phase	“a	
level	playing	field”	has	appeared	in	these	countries	for	long,	the	term	“competitive	neutral-
ity”	is	still	fairly	new.	As	a	result,	the	academic	paper	on	this	topic	is	still	limited	and	most	of	
them	do	not	give	much	in-depth	content	on	the	core	topic.	The	legal	framework	for	compet-
itive	neutrality	has	not	existed	yet	or	still	in	the	very	beginning	stages	of	drafting.	All	of	these	
things	reflect	the	shortage	of	trained	professionals	on	the	enforcement	of	the	principles	of	
competitive	neutrality.	Hence,	in	order	to	establish	a	level	playing	field	in	the	national	econ-
omy,	developing	countries,	in	general	and	Vietnam,	in	particular	should	take	immediate	ac-
tions	to	tackle	this	problem.	
b)	Particular	challenges	of	Vietnam	
-	Lack	of	a	competitive	neutrality	legal	framework	
Until	now,	a	number	of	countries	in	the	world	have	already	adopted	a	separate	legal	
framework	for	competitive	neutrality,	however,	Vietnam	is	not	one	of	such	nations.	Under	
the	given	circumstance	that	competitive	neutrality	is	still	a	rather	new	term	in	Vietnam,	it	is	
understandable.	Competitive	neutrality	is	not	even	officially	named	in	the	official	law	system	
of	the	country,	but	the	general	idea	of	competitive	neutrality	–	a	level	playing	field	is	referred	
in	 a	 number	 of	 relating	 laws	 such	 as	 State	 Enterprises	 Law	 1995,	 Law	 on	 Enterprises	
2005/2014,	Commercial	Law	1997/2005	etc.	 in	which	competitive	neutrality	 is	presented	
most	clearly	in	the	Law	on	Competition	2004.	Regarding	State	Enterprises	Law	1995/2003,	
the	general	principle	is	that	SOEs	have	to	make	the	best	use	of	the	preferences	they	receive	
to	fulfill	their	responsibilities	without	much	concern	about	competitive	neutrality.	In	Law	on	
Enterprises	2014,	the	transparency	and	accountability	of	SOE’s	business	activities	have	been	
highlighted	 however,	 the	 governance	 of	 competitive	 relating	 practices	 of	 government	
owned	businesses	has	not	been	shown	in	this	law.	With	reference	to	Commercial	Law	2005,	
being	influenced	by	the	non-discriminatory	principle,	this	Law	demonstrated	more	consid-
erations	to	competitive	neutrality	stating	that	it	is	one	of	government’s	responsibilities	to	
treat	all	business	entities	in	an	equal	manner	irrespective	of	their	ownership	relationships	
and	economic	areas	(Article	10,	Commercial	Law	2005).	SOEs	can	practice	their	monopoly	
position	but	only	for	a	limited	period	of	time	within	a	specific	list	of	goods,	services	and	areas	
provided	by	the	government	(Article	6,	Commercial	Law	2005).		
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As	stated	above,	the	fundamental	principles	of	competitive	neutrality	are	mostly	given	
in	Law	on	Competition	2004.	Before	the	promulgation	of	the	Competition	Law,	anticompet-
itive	acts	or	monopolies	in	some	specific	areas	had	been	regulated	by	separate	and	scattered	
provisions	in	a	number	of	legislations	such	as	the	Ordinance	on	Price	2002,	the	Ordinance	
on	Telecommunications,	the	Law	on	Credit	Institutions	1997,	Commercial	Law	1997,	Elec-
tricity	Law	2004,	etc.	(Trinh	Anh,	2013).	Enterprises	operating	in	certain	markets	are	required	
to	comply	with	the	law	subject	to	that	particular	market,	therefore,	competitive	neutrality	
relating	 regulations	may	 still	 take	 into	 effect,	 to	 some	 extent.	Nonetheless,	 it	 should	 be	
noted	that	because	of	the	very	limited	amount	of	content	on	competitive	neutrality,	the	lack	
of	proper	awareness	among	target	business	entities	and	the	inadequacy	of	strict	enforce-
ment	in	practice,	these	law	systems	have	not	contributed	much	to	the	implementation	of	
competitive	neutrality.			
-	Competitive	neutrality	in	framework	of	Competition	Law	
As	non-discrimination	 is	one	of	 the	 fundamental	principles	of	Competition	Law,	this	
Law	deals	with	all	kinds	of	competitive	relating	activities	of	all	business	entities,	state	and	
non-state	sector,	domestic	as	well	as	foreign	invested	enterprises	in	Vietnam.	Competitive	
neutrality,	therefore,	is	the	content	of	Competition	Law	controlling	the	agreements	in	re-
straint	of	competition,	the	abuse	of	dominant	market	position	and	monopoly	position,	eco-
nomic	concentration	activities	and	unfair	competitive	practices	of	all	economic	sectors	 in	
general	and	of	government	ownership	sector	 in	particular.	So	 far,	Vietnam	has	put	more	
efforts	in	neutralizing	the	advantages	accruing	to	SOEs,	however,	the	protection	of	the	state	
to	companies	of	its	own	has	not	been	fully	taken	down.	To	be	more	specific,	Law	on	Compe-
tition	prevents	government	owned	businesses	from	abusing	their	state	power	to	take	into	
competitive	restriction	actions	in	the	market	(Article	6,	Law	on	Competition	2004).	Compe-
tition	Law	declares	to	prohibit	economic	agreements	that	restrict	the	fair	competitive	envi-
ronment	in	the	market,	however,	it	also	gives	exemptions	for	such	agreements	to	be	legally	
executed	 if	 they	 promote	 consumers’	 benefits	 (Article	 10,	 Law	on	 Competition	 2004).	 It	
means	that	economic	restriction	agreements	can	be	allowed	to	carry	on	if	the	state	agrees	
that	they	fall	into	one	of	the	exemption	cases.	Thus,	from	this	perspective,	SOEs	can	easily	
gain	advantages	due	to	the	support	of	government	to	classify	enterprises	of	its	ownership	
as	exemption	cases.	Another	Competition	Law’s	provision	particularly	relating	to	competi-
tive	neutrality	is	the	one	concerning	governance	of	enterprises	operating	in	State	monopoly	
sectors	and	of	enterprises	engaged	in	production	or	supply	of	public	utility	products	or	ser-
vices	(Article	15,	Law	on	Competition	2004).	This	could	as	well	be	considered	as	Vietnam’s	
government	attempts	to	continue	granting	undue	advantages	to	SOEs	over	other	market	
participants.	
-	Government	interference	under	the	label	of	“state	economic	management”	
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It	was	stated	in	Vietnamese	Constitution	that	Vietnamese	Government	plays	a	pivotal	
role	in	socio-economic	management	(the	Government	shall	carry	out	overall	management	
of	the	work	for	the	fulfilment	of	the	political,	economic,	cultural,	social	(…)	Article	109	Con-
stitution	1992).	Hence,	state	economic	management	in	the	markets	is	taken	for	granted	in	
the	economic	context	of	Vietnam.	However,	the	centralized	economic	state	management	
which	was	established	with	the	aim	of	not	only	dramatic	economic	growth	but	also	strength-
ening	the	economic	role	of	the	state	in	the	national	economy	brought	undesirable	outcomes	
which	are	the	economic	stagnation	and	the	inefficiency	of	the	state	sector	itself.	Paying	the	
heavy	price	for	its	emphasis	being	placed	too	much	in	the	“state	economic	management”,	
Vietnamese	Government	has	changed	its	understanding	of	government	interference	level	in	
the	markets	(Porter,	1993).	The	national	economy	has	been	orientated	into	the	direction	of	
a	market	economy	where	government	intervention	only	takes	place	when	there	is	market	
failure	and	state	economic	management	is	necessary	to	fix	that.	
On	the	other	hand,	it	is	obvious	that	it	takes	quite	a	lot	of	time	to	transfer	from	the	
changing	awareness	of	Government	of	Vietnam	about	their	roles	in	the	markets	to	a	decisive	
shift	in	the	economic	management	policy	and	implementation	(Tomasic,	2016).	That	is	re-
flected	in	the	fact	that	the	protection	from	the	government	to	SOEs	 is	still	carried	out	to	
maintain	the	leading	economic	role	of	the	public	sector	in	the	national	economy.	One	of	the	
most	concrete	evidence	is	that	government-owned	companies	have	not	fully	complied	with	
the	 official	 law	 and	 policies	 of	 Vietnamese	 Government.	 These	 two	 following	 examples	
which	have	currently	happened	in	Vietnam	will	be	convincing	demonstration	for	this	point.			
The	acquisition	of	EVN	(Electricity	of	Vietnam)	Telecom	which	was	made	by	Viettel	-	
the	military-run	telecommunications	company	in	late	2011	is	a	prime	example	for	the	wide	
spreading	notoriety	that	SOEs	are	immune	from	the	legal	governance	of	Vietnam’s	Govern-
ment.	EVN	Telecom	is	a	business	unit	of	EVN	which	is	forced	to	separate	from	the	parent	
company	as	 it	 is	not	compatible	with	the	core	business	of	a	state	monopoly	 in	electricity	
(Nguyen,	2014)5.	At	that	time,	Viettel	has	already	occupied	37%	of	the	telecommunication	
market,	hence,	 the	combined	market	share	of	 the	two	company	would	definitely	exceed	
30%	meaning	 that	 this	 economic	 concentration	must	 be	 notified	 to	 VCA.	 In	 addition,	 it	
should	be	noted	that	the	Government	only	gave	4	mobile	operators	the	permission	to	supply	
the	3G	service,	which	are:	Viettel,	Vinaphone,	MobiFone	and	EVN.	Thus,	as	Viettel	has	al-
ready	held	more	than	50%	of	the	national	3G’s	frequent	resources,	the	acquisition	would	
strengthen	the	excessive	power	of	Viettel	in	the	3G	supply	market	where	only	3	participants	
remain	(Consumer	Unity	and	Trust	Society	 International,	2011).	From	these	perspectives,	
the	acquisition	would	definitely	do	harm	to	the	healthy	competition	in	Vietnam.	However,	
                                                
5 Nguyen Thuy, Anh, Economic Concentration: Raising Problems from the View of the Competition Law, in 
Rosenau/Tang Van, (eds. 2014) Economic Competition Regime: Raising Issues and Lessons from Germany, 
Nomos, Baden-Baden (Germany). 
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no	prior	notification	was	sent	and	in	fact,	Government	of	Vietnam	agreed	for	this	acquisition	
to	be	successfully	implemented	(Consumer	Unity	and	Trust	Society	International,	2011).		
More	recently,	the	public	has	been	once	again	concerned	about	government	interfer-
ence	 in	 the	case	of	MobiFone	-	 	a	 limited	 liability	company	with	100%	state	capital	after	
being	separated	from	VNPT	(Vietnam	Posts	and	Telecommunications	group)	–	the	mother	
state-owned	company.	In	December	2015,	Ministry	of	Information	and	Communication	has	
accepted	the	proposal	of	MobiFone	to	invest	into	the	project	of	television	service	as	a	deci-
sive	step	in	their	strategic	business	plan.	After	that,	the	acquisition	of	AVG	joint	stock	ven-
ture	company	has	been	implemented	by	MobiFone.	According	to	some	previous	unofficial	
information	source,	MobiFone	has	bought	95%	of	AVG,	notwithstanding,	the	precise	infor-
mation	has	not	been	released	despite	the	request	from	the	public.	It	can	be	considered	as	a	
violation	 practice	 of	 MobiFone	 to	 Decree	 81/2015/ND-CP,	 hence	 the	 Government	 has	
started	an	investigation	on	this	case,	but	all	the	information	will	still	be	kept	confidential	(Ly,	
2016).		
-	The	legal	enforcement	of	competition	authority	is	still	limited,	lack	of	control	power	
and	decisive	impacts.	
In	fact,	the	legal	enforcement	of	Vietnam’s	Competition	Law	is	implemented	by	VCA	
and	Competition	Council.	 In	which,	VCA	only	takes	the	responsibility	of	 investigating,	col-
lecting	and	searching	for	evidence	relating	to	a	case,	while	Competition	Council	is	in	charge	
of	sentencing,	handling,	making	decision,	settling	complaint	relating	to	the	received	com-
plaints.	Given	the	uniqueness	in	the	characteristics	of	Vietnamese	economy,	together	with	
the	incompletion	in	the	legal	framework	and	the	inexperience	of	a	country	that	has	put	their	
efforts	on	competitive	issues	for	the	first	time,	the	official	competition	authority	in	Vietnam	
are	facing	certain	difficulties	and	inadequacies.	
The	first	difficulty	for	VCA	stays	in	the	limitations	of	their	human	capacity.	It	should	be	
stressed	here	that	Vietnam	Competition	Authority	is	the	state	management	agency	in	3	do-
mains:	 Competition,	Consumer	Protection	and	Trade	 Safeguards,	 therefore,	 the	 complex	
and	 large-scale	 nature	 of	 the	 process	 of	 handling	 competition	 complaints	 requires	 their	
staffs	to	work	independently	and	actively,	indicating	the	shortage	in	the	number	of	govern-
ment	officials.	Besides,	staffs	working	in	VCA	are	also	required	to	have	sufficient	expertise	
to	work	in	almost	all	economic	fields	while	over	80%	of	its	officers	working	have	graduated	
within	5	years	implying	their	limited	work	experience.	The	second	difficulty	of	VCA	comes	
from	the	lack	of	legal	basis	to	use	funds	for	professional	work,	completing	assigned	political	
tasks.	Taking	into	account	the	fact	that	the	agency	has	just	newly	established	with	new	func-
tions,	it	is	understandable	that	administration	budget	for	its	operation	is	not	appropriate,	
even	inadequate	to	fulfil	their	responsibilities.		
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In	 terms	of	 inadequacies,	when	 the	 case	of	 SOE	 is	 investigated	and	handled	by	 the	
members	of	Competition	Council	(Vietnam	Competition	Council	has	11	members	represent-
ing	many	ministries)	who	are	also	under	the	same	Ministry,	it	will	be	difficult	to	maintain	the	
fairness	and	objectivity	of	the	final	conclusion	on	the	given	case.	In	addition,	as	the	investi-
gation	and	collection	of	proof	are	carried	out	by	VCA,	it	surely	takes	time	for	members	of	
Vietnam	Competition	Council	to	reach	a	thorough	decision	for	the	case,	prolonging	the	case	
handling	process.	Moreover,	another	problem	that	should	also	be	brought	to	light	here	is	
that	the	integration	of	3	domains:	Competition,	Consumer	Protection	and	Trade	Safeguards	
in	 VCA	 can	 certainly	 reduce	 its	 effectiveness	 due	 to	 their	 different	 work	 nature	
(Rosenau/Tang	Van	2014).		
-	Information	is	not	available	due	to	the	lack	of	transparency	and	accountability	in	allo-
cation	of	resources.	
The	disclosure	of	precise	information	in	a	timely	manner	can	have	tremendous	impacts	
taking	into	account	the	leading	role	that	SOEs	play	in	the	national	economy.	The	revelation	
of	corporate	information	by	the	public	sector	provides	a	solid	background	for	the	transpar-
ency	of	state-owned	sector,	the	control	of	operational	efficiency	as	well	as	the	compliance	
of	laws	and	regulations.	In	a	broader	sense,	the	disclosure	on	the	performance	of	govern-
ment-owned	entities	gives	investors	a	closer	look	into	the	real	capacity	of	SOEs,	gives	the	
public	the	right	to	get	access	to	the	distribution	and	usage	of	public	funds,	gives	Government	
of	Vietnam	the	ability	to	hold	SOEs	accountable	for	the	final	results.	Moreover,	improving	
information	disclosure	of	the	public	sector	is	considered	as	a	requirement	for	its	own	sake	
as	it	acts	as	the	driving	force	for	the	enhancement	of	its	overall	efficiency.	Such	desirable	
outcomes	from	better	control	on	information	disclosure	have	been	proved	through	the	real	
process	in	Malaysia	and	Lithuania	prompting	Government	of	Vietnam	to	take	actions	imme-
diately.	
The	most	current	efforts	of	Government	of	Vietnam	on	improving	transparency	and	
accountability	of	SOEs	can	be	seen	from	Decree	No.	99/2012/ND-CP	dated	back	to	Novem-
ber	15,	2012	on	“the	Implementation	of	the	Rights,	Responsibilities	and	Obligations	of	State	
Owner	for	SOEs”	(Smith	et.al.,	2014).	It	should	be	stressed	here	that	SOEs	are	imposed	with	
little	obligation	to	public	disclosure	on	financial	and	non-financial	information.	Also,	the	reg-
ulated	disclosure	is	mostly	internal	and	public	disclosure	is	 largely	voluntary.	Besides,	the	
regulations	on	the	disclosure	of	SOEs	are	fragmented,	hence,	if	government	owned	compa-
nies	attempt	to	follow	them,	it	would	be	a	huge	administrative	burden.		
In	fact,	the	situation	of	information	disclosure	implemented	by	SOEs	in	Vietnam	is	quite	
disappointing.	 Actually,	 improving	 information	 disclosure	 among	 the	 government-owned	
sector	 is	one	 the	 top	priorities	due	 to	 the	alarming	 results	 from	a	survey	 in	2012	on	 the	
transparency	of	the	State	Budget	in	Vietnam.	Information	disclosed	by	SOEs	can	be	found	
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through	3	main	resources	which	are	(i)	primary	data	and	analysis;	(ii)	existing	literature	re-
view;	and	(iii)	anecdotal	 information	from	interviews,	workshops	and	meetings.	With	the	
first	source	of	information,	many	SOEs	have	a	functioning	website,	however,	it	is	used	mostly	
as	a	marketing	tool	rather	than	as	a	channel	of	information	disclosure.	From	these	two	last	
sources	mentioned	earlier,	 it	 is	also	found	out	that	most	information	disclosure	is	carried	
out	internally	rather	than	externally	or	publicly.	For	example,	about	95	percent	of	SOEs	in	
Vietnam	presents	reports	in	the	written	form	to	the	owner	line-ministries6/agencies	and	to	
the	board	of	director;	70	percent	even	release	financial	statements	concerning	production	
performance	such	as	profit	and	loss	statement	and	balance	sheet;	on	the	other	hand,	only	7	
percent	of	all	SOEs	make	their	reports	available	to	the	public	and	9	percent	use	mass	media	
in	 their	 information	 disclosure.	 While	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 have	 not	 been	
achieved	in	the	national	economy	yet,	it	is	surely	a	significant	challenge	to	the	establishment	
of	competitive	neutrality	in	Vietnam.		
VI.	RECOMMENDATIONS	FOR	VIETNAM	IN	APPLYING	COMPETITIVE	NEUTRALITY	
1.	Reforming	legal	framework	toward	competitive	neutrality		
As	mentioned	above,	competitive	neutrality	principles	are	only	 indirectly	referred	in	
several	relating	economic	laws	without	having	its	specific	legal	regulation	system.	In	order	
to	make	competitive	neutrality	a	reality	in	Vietnam,	the	promulgation	of	competitive	neu-
trality	regime	is	considered	as	one	of	the	most	useful	tools.	By	establishing	a	competitive	
neutrality	legal	framework,	the	control	of	business	activities	of	publicly	owned	sector	would	
be	tightened.	This	paper	is	going	to	give	recommendations	on	the	most	essential	contents	
of	competitive	neutrality	law	under	the	current	circumstance	of	Vietnam’s	economy:	
The	scope	of	governance:	While	the	competitive	neutrality	policy	of	Australia	only	ap-
plies	to	significant	business	activities,	in	the	situation	of	Vietnam	the	competitive	neutrality	
law	should	be	subject	to	all	business	activities	of	SOEs.	So	far,	Vietnamese	Government’s	
owned	businesses	have	not	only	focused	on	the	industries	of	their	responsibility	but	also	
expanded	to	other	non-core	business	areas.	SOEs	have	used	preferential	treatments	from	
the	government	to	compete	with	competitors	from	other	sectors,	negatively	affecting	the	
fair	 competition	 of	 all	 the	markets	 that	 they	 participate	 including	 the	 non-focused	 ones	
(McLure,	2013).	Hence,	with	the	subject	of	competitive	neutrality	law,	the	governance	scope	
should	be	all	business	activities	of	this	economic	entity.		
                                                
6 In principle, SOEs are free to conduct business and compete with each other on the market. But their business 
activities are strictly run by the owner line ministry. This depends on the specific field governed by the competent 
ministry.  
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Tax	neutrality:	Taxation	system	is	the	issue	recommended	as	one	of	the	key	principles	
in	setting	up	competitive	neutrality	policy	in	Vietnam.	In	the	Reform,	Vietnamese	Govern-
ment	has	made	progress	on	improving	the	taxation	system,	however,	more	still	needs	to	be	
done	as	the	competition	in	the	market	is	still	negatively	influenced	by	the	abuse	of	a	number	
of	tax	advantages	of	SOEs	(Leonard,	2013).	The	aim	of	tax	neutrality	is	to	impose	an	appro-
priate	amount	of	tax	which	promotes	government-owned	businesses	to	fulfill	their	respon-
sibilities	in	the	relating	market	and	the	public	benefits	while	eliminating	the	adverse	impacts	
of	tax	advantages	granted	to	them	on	the	competition	at	the	same	time.	Tax	calculated	in	a	
case-by-case	basis	as	Australia	is	also	recommended	for	Vietnam	due	to	its	effectiveness.	
Debt	neutrality:	SOEs	in	Vietnam	gain	advantages	over	private	sector	in	terms	of	debt	
through	favorable	interest	rate	of	loans	or	governmental	subsidies.	Therefore,	in	order	to	
ensure	an	equal	treatment	to	all	business	sectors	in	this	regard,	Vietnamese	Government	
must	 tighten	 its	 control	 of	 charging	 its	 owned	 sector	 in	 using	 the	 national	 capital.	 SOEs	
should	be	required	to	pay	reasonable	interest	rates	which	give	them	proper	incentives	to	
perform	their	political	roles	but	cannot	use	them	to	harm	the	healthy	competition	in	the	
market.	The	state	subsidy	should	also	be	reviewed	whether	it	is	granted	for	the	right	enter-
prises	so	that	it	can	reach	its	goals	without	going	against	the	concept	of	competitive	neu-
trality.	Under	Vietnam’s	present	circumstance,	it	is	recommended	that	the	interest	rate	of	
debts	and	governmental	subsidies	be	set	up	from	industry	to	industry.		
Regulatory	neutrality:	After	the	expiration	of	the	Law	on	SOEs	2003,	until	now,	there	is	
no	official	law	specified	for	business	activities	of	the	government	owned	sector	in	Vietnam	
(Nguyen,	2011).	Without	competitive	neutrality	framework,	SOEs	have	abused	the	exemp-
tions	or	the	flaws	in	the	regulatory	regime	to	compete	against	their	present	and	even	po-
tential	competitors	causing	reduction	and	distortion	to	the	economic	competition.	It	is	sug-
gested	that	the	Government	carefully	goes	through	all	the	laws	which	apply	to	SOEs	to	make	
adjustments	on	regulatory	preferences	they	are	going	to	enjoy	and	the	ones	that	will	be	
removed.	In	addition,	the	legal	provision	and	documents	applied	for	SOEs	in	particular	areas	
of	the	national	economy	should	also	be	thoroughly	reviewed	to	update	with	changes	in	the	
market	as	well	as	to	be	in	compliance	with	competitive	neutrality	policy.	
Rate	of	return	requirement:	The	rate	of	return	on	the	state	capital	has	been	brought	as	
an	essential	 issue	of	the	adjustments	of	Financial	Policy	in	the	Reform	of	Vietnam	(Wolff,	
1999).	In	order	to	create	a	legal	environment	that	promotes	fair	competitive	business,	it	is	
impartial	that	while	private	enterprises	operate	on	their	own,	SOEs	are	required	to	meet	the	
rate	of	return	on	the	preferential	treatment	they	receive	to	use	the	national	budget	(Inter-
national	Monetary	Fund,	2004).	However,	as	 the	performance	of	SOEs	 in	Vietnam	 is	 still	
viewed	as	inefficient	and	wasteful,	more	efforts	should	be	put	to	improve	the	regulations	
on	the	rate	of	return	on	the	state	equity	of	SOEs.	In	compliance	with	competitive	neutrality	
policy,	the	appropriate	rate	of	return	is	required	to	take	into	account	the	social	obligations	
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of	government-owned	sector	while	forcing	SOEs	to	fairly	compete	with	other	competitors	
by	enhancing	productivity	without	relying	on	support	from	the	Government.	In	fact,	as	the	
number	of	SOEs	in	Vietnam	have	been	reducing	currently,	the	rate	of	return	calculated	in	a	
case-by-case	basis	as	in	Australia	is	feasible	to	apply.	
2.	Raising	Awareness	of	Competition	Law	and	competitive	neutrality			
While	Competition	Law	has	only	been	enacted	in	2004	and	competitive	neutrality	law	
adoption	is	still	under	consideration,	they	are	not	only	new	to	the	official	authority,	policy	
makers	and	economic	researchers	but	also	to	the	public.	When	the	general	public	do	not	
have	much	understanding	of	Competition	Law	and	competitive	neutrality,	they	will	not	have	
the	appropriate	attitude	towards	the	implementation	of	them.	As	a	consequence,	an	effec-
tive	enforcement	of	competition	regime	will	be	almost	impossible	to	be	achieved	as	its	sub-
jects	do	not	thoroughly	evaluate	the	value	of	Competition	Law	and	competitive	neutrality	
let	alone	having	comprehensive	understanding	of	them.	Hence,	one	of	the	top	priorities	in	
the	way	to	achieve	effectiveness	of	competitive	neutrality	enforcement	is	to	raise	up	the	
awareness	of	the	general	public,	especially	enterprises	from	all	economic	sectors	on	Com-
petition	Law	and	competitive	neutrality.	
3.	Improving	Governance	of	SOEs	and	redefining	the	role	of	SOEs	
The	third	suggestion	for	the	establishment	of	competitive	neutrality	in	Vietnam	is	that	
the	Government	should	tighten	the	control	of	their	owned	sector,	together	with	making	ad-
justments	on	the	responsibilities	of	SOEs	in	the	economy.	Improving	governance	of	SOEs	can	
be	 achieved	 through	 an	 effective	 complaints	 mechanism	 which	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	
strengthening	 the	 power	 of	 relating	 laws	 in	 real	 implementation.	 Hence,	 together	 with	
adopting	a	legal	framework	and	enacting	detailed	guidance	on	the	implementation	of	com-
petitive	neutrality,	setting	up	a	complaints	mechanism	is	a	valuable	suggestion	for	Vietnam	
as	well.	The	VCA	can	perform	the	responsibility	of	dealing	with	complaints	about	breaches	
of	competitive	neutrality	policy.	However,	in	order	to	reach	that	goal,	there	should	be	a	clear	
set	of	financial	fines	and	rigorous	procedure	of	investigation	when	dealing	with	competitive	
neutrality	complaints.	
To	refine	the	particular	role	of	the	public	sector	in	the	market,	guidance	on	the	imple-
mentation	of	competitive	neutrality	law	and	policy	should	be	implemented	representing	the	
orientations	of	the	government	in	the	operation	of	its	own	sector.	Moreover,	the	economic	
law	system	is	often	general	and	broad	so	the	introduction	of	binding	precedent	system	or	
guidance	to	support	market	participants	in	the	real	implementation	is	essential.	In	fact,	the	
existing	laws	supporting	the	reform	of	Vietnam	such	as	Enterprise	Law	1999,	State-owned	
Enterprise	Law	in	2003,	Law	on	Foreign	Investment	2005/2014	etc.	has	not	helped	the	re-
form	 to	 gain	 the	 best	 results	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 adequate	 guidance	 on	 implementation	
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(UNCTAD,	2014).	Competitive	neutrality	guidance	is	recommended	to	clarify	the	controver-
sial	definitions,	the	measures	to	carry	out	competitive	neutrality	principles,	the	merits	and	
demerits	of	each	measure,	under	which	circumstances	each	measure	is	applied,	etc.	From	
that,	the	rights	and	obligations	of	Government	owned	enterprises	are	clearly	stated	by	the	
State	to	the	awareness	of	all	kinds	of	commercial	entity.	
4.	Transparency	and	accountability	in	allocation	of	resource			
As	presented	above,	the	lack	of	transparency	and	accountability	in	how	the	resources	
are	distributed	among	the	economy	is	one	of	the	most	serious	challenges	to	Vietnamese	
Government	in	the	way	of	achieving	competitive	neutrality.	Only	when	the	allocation	of	re-
sources	 is	clearly	revealed,	all	 the	advantages	and	preferential	that	SOEs	receive	from	its	
Government	will	be	excluded	leaving	a	fair	competitive	environment	for	all	market	partici-
pants.	For	all	favors	that	the	government-owned	sector	being	granted	as	compensation	for	
the	public	service	obligation	that	they	have	to	bear,	the	transparency	and	accountability	of	
such	information	creates	the	platform	for	applications	of	competitive	neutrality.	In	general,	
with	the	availability	of	 information	of	resource	allocation,	 	 the	 implementation	of	all	 five	
principles	of	competitive	neutrality	can	be	put	into	real	practice.	To	be	more	specific,	when	
it	is	revealed	how	much	of	the	public	fund	is	used	by	SOEs,	all	the	calculations	on	the	tax	
neutrality,	debt	neutrality	and	rate	of	return	will	be	worked	out.	The	difference	in	the	treat-
ment	of	the	Government	between	public	sector	and	other	sectors	will	also	be	seen.	Regula-
tory	neutrality	will	be	gained	from	this	as	well.	All	of	them	build	up	an	ideal	background	for	
the	implementation	of	competitive	neutrality,	therefore	this	is	a	recommendation	that	Vi-
etnamese	Government	should	give	put	into	serious	consideration.	
5.	Evaluate	the	reform	program	of	SOEs	of	Vietnam	
The	process	of	the	reform	of	SOEs	in	Vietnam	has	taken	off	since	1992	with	a	lot	of	
continuous	and	noncontinuous	efforts,	transforming	the	structure	of	hundreds	of	compa-
nies	under	government	ownership.	This	reform	of	SOEs	is	a	crucial	pillar	of	the	Government’s	
structural reform and productivity agenda (ADB,	2015).	Rising	international	economic	inte-
gration	speeded	also	up	this	process.	Furthermore,	the	new	program	aiming	to	restructuring	
SOEs	and	to	strengthening	the	effect	of	equitation	of	SOEs	had	been	launched	over	the	years	
(Sjöholm	2006)	due	to	the	performance	of	SOEs.	The	Vietnamese	experiences	over	the	last	
three	decades	have	shown	that	most	of	the	SOEs	equitized	through	this	process	were	small	
unprofitable	enterprises,	with	the	larger	SOEs	occupying	the	majority	of	economic	activity	
and	employment	remaining	intact	(ADB,	2015).	Although	the	performance	of	SOEs	has	been	
still	limited,	it	cannot	be	denied	that	reforms	of	SOEs	have	gained	results	in	improving	com-
petitiveness	and	operational	efficiency	of	this	special	sector.			
Because	the	reform	and	the	equitization	of	SOEs	are a challenging and continuing pro-
cess, the	evaluation	of	this	process	from	a	practical	perspective	of	Vietnam	is	necessary.	It	
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is	time	for	Vietnamese	Government	to	look	back	on	the	strategy	of	state	economy	group	
and	make	evaluations	of	 the	outcomes	before	continuing	carrying	out	 this	program.	This	
should	contribute	not	only	to	strengthening	the	performance	of	SOEs	but	also	to	expanding	
the	private	 sectors,	which	prepare	 crucial	preconditions	 for	 further	applying	 competitive	
neutrality	in	Vietnam.	
VII.	CONCLUSION	
Globalization	trend,	together	with	advanced	technology	has	made	the	world	smaller	
than	ever	as	geographical	distance	is	no	longer	an	obstacle.	The	global	economy	has	become	
a	playing	field	for	all	countries	in	the	world	regardless	of	their	position	or	economic	status.	
From	that,	the	demand	of	a	level	playing	field	for	all	business	entities	has	been	imposed	not	
only	for	the	international	economy,	but	also	for	the	national	economy	of	countries	in	the	
world.	This	current	situation	calls	for	the	notion	of	competitive	neutrality	which	is	relatively	
new	to	the	world	emerging	as	“A	21st	Century	Issue”.	For	the	past	several	decades,	compet-
itive	neutrality	has	drawn	significant	amount	of	attention	among	developed	countries,	nev-
ertheless,	not	many	legislative	efforts	have	been	put	by	developing	governments	so	far	to	
address	this	issue.	Especial,	the	common	circumstance	of	most	developing	countries	is	the	
dominance	of	the	inefficient	state-owned	sector	in	the	market	hampering	the	healthy	com-
petitiveness	in	the	economy.	Therefore,	even	though	competitive	neutrality	still	appears	as	
a	rather	new	term	in	most	countries	all	over	the	world,	it	has	become	a	real	necessity	for	
the	developing	nations.	
Competitive	neutrality	is	so	essential	in	the	context	of	developing	economies	as	it	plays	
an	important	role	for	keeping	the	appropriate	competition	regime.	In	other	words,	compet-
itive	neutrality	is	of	paramount	importance	to	the	open	competition	between	SOEs	and	pri-
vate	owned	ones	as	it	helps	to	promote	a	fair	competition	mechanism	for	both	sectors.	To	
the	government-owned	companies,	competitive	neutrality	does	not	only	prevent	them	from	
taking	actions	that	do	harm	to	the	healthy	competition	in	the	market	but	also	acts	as	the	
driving	 force	 for	 enhancement	 in	 their	 productivity	 and	 competitiveness.	 To	 the	 private	
owned	 sector,	 competitive	 neutrality	 regime	 protects	 them	 from	 the	 unfair	 competitive	
practices	of	the	public	sector	allowing	them	to	fully	develop	and	reach	their	maximum	po-
tential.	It	is	mostly	the	case	in	developing	countries	that	private	owned	sector	is	the	more	
active	than	the	public	one,	therefore	through	competitive	neutrality	 implementation,	the	
law	fosters	their	development,	innovations	and	thrive.		
With	the	ultimate	goal	of	creating	and	maintaining	a	level	playing	field	for	all	market	
participants,	competitive	neutrality	acts	as	the	driving	force	for	SOEs	doing	business	more	
efficiently	and	fosters	domestic	economic	growth	and	consumer	welfare,	directly	and	indi-
rectly.	 With	 reference	 to	 SOEs,	 competitive	 neutrality	 regime	 pushes	 the	 government-
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owned	sector	to	compete	by	their	internal	capacity	and	business	efficiency.	To	be	more	spe-
cific,	strictly	following	the	principle	of	non-discriminatory,	the	legal	enforcement	of	compet-
itive	neutrality	 treats	enterprises	 from	all	different	economic	 sectors	 in	a	 fair	manner.	 It	
means	that	no	market	participants,	even	SOEs,	can	use	their	relations	with	the	government	
to	get	away	with	their	contravention	of	the	fair	competitive	environment.	Therefore,	in	or-
der	to	compete,	SOEs	have	no	other	choices	left	but	to	increase	their	operational	efficiency,	
improve	their	business	performance	and	enhance	their	competitiveness.	SOEs	directly	ben-
efit	from	a	perfect	competitive	mechanism,	the	national	economy	and	consumers	are	the	
subjects	who	indirectly	benefit	from	the	implementation	of	competitive	neutrality.	With	ref-
erence	to	consumer	welfare,	competitive	neutrality	support	the	completion	of	the	compet-
itive	economic	environment	allowing	them	to	benefit	from	wider	product	range	with	higher	
quality	at	a	more	 reasonable	price.	With	 reference	 to	 the	domestic	economy,	 instead	of	
holding	the	whole	economy	back	from	development	with	their	low	productivity	and	lagged	
business	performance,	SOEs	boost	national	economic	growth	in	the	new	playing	field	lev-
elled	by	competitive	neutrality	legal	regime.	
Given	the	unique	circumstance	of	Vietnam,	while	competitive	neutrality	still	remains	a	
relatively	new	phase	in	our	country	and	as	a	result,	its	implementation	has	not	been	thor-
oughly	carried	out,	Government	of	Vietnam	should	take	into	serious	consideration	the	es-
tablishment	of	competitive	neutrality	policy.	Under	 requirements	 for	a	 level	playing	 field	
from	the	country	itself,	along	with	the	pressure	of	fulfilling	its	commitments	to	a	number	of	
international	 economic	 organizations,	 the	 government	 should	 take	 into	 action	 to	 tackle	
problems	in	the	face	of	adversity	from	unfair	competitive	practices	of	SOEs.	As	mentioned,	
after	a	lot	of	stop-and-go	efforts,	the	reform	process	in	Vietnam	has	gained	moderate	suc-
cess	but	it	is	still	on	the	way	of	completion.	It	is	strongly	recommended	that	Government	of	
Vietnam	places	heavy	emphasis	on	restructuring	and	reforming	SOEs	as	well	as	speeding	up	
the	privatization	processes.	With	unceasing	efforts,	proper	methods	and	strong	determina-
tion,	competitive	neutrality	is	surely	an	achievable	goal	for	the	Government	of	Vietnam.	 	
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